

BALANCING ON THE PIVOT: HOW CHINA'S RISE AND OFFSHORE
BALANCING AFFECT JAPAN AND INDIA'S ROLES AS BALANCERS IN
THE 21ST CENTURY

BY

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DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the US Air Force, or Air University.

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ABSTRACT

The US has used primacy as its grand strategy for some time now. While this strategy has ensured US hegemony, it has also fiscally drained American power and left the US with a poor global standing. As such, rethinking US grand strategy should be considered in order to maintain its relative position in the 21st century. The US is poised to pivot East, to meet the demands of China as a rising challenger. The question I raise here is how viable would an alternative grand strategy in Asia be? There is considerable enthusiasm in some corners of the policymaking world for the US to return to a balancing strategy in Asia. Formerly known as offshore balancing, the strategy aims to conserve American power as it deals with the challenges of a rising China. One important, albeit overlooked element of offshore balancing is: who plays the role of the balancer? This thesis seeks to answer that question.

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Introduction

Getting Balance Back into the Lexicon of Grand Strategy

The same is even truer for grand strategy. In a world where great states confront overstretch, they must make hard choices. Thus, in the end, grand strategy is more often than not about the ability to adjust to the reality that resources, will, and interest inevitably find themselves out of balance in some areas. Strategy is about balancing risk. But above all, it is about insuring that the balance is right in those areas that matter most. And in times of great stress, it is also about adapting national focus on the international environment to those areas of overstretch that threaten the polity to the greatest extent.

Williamson Murray

The US is in a state of transition. As states navigate transitions within the international security environment, they must assess the grand strategy upon which the nation rests and determine if they have effectively balanced resources, will and national interests. After more than ten years of fighting two wars in a changing global environment, some would argue the time is suitable for considering a change in US grand strategy. More than considering such a change, the US has reached the point that it should now make hard choices about its grand strategy. Currently, the US suffers from overstretch, the strain of two major wars, economic depression, a stagnant Congress, and the lingering effects of following a hegemonic strategy. The combination of these issues has failed to contain China's rise. Williamson Murray's quote above epitomizes the adjustment that will be required to re-balance US resources, will, and interest.

Balance of power strategy suggests hegemony is inherently unstable and thus a non-winning grand strategy; some believe the US lacks the resources to sustain its present predominance.¹ Simply put, the status quo is untenable. In *Grand Strategy*, Elbridge Colby aptly defines grand strategy as “a nation’s conscious effort to employ all elements of national power to advance and fulfill its security-related objectives in the foreign sphere.”² This definition best supports this research. Christopher Layne simplifies the definition, stating, “Distilled to its essence, grand strategy is about determining a state’s vital interests—those important enough to fight over—and its role in the world.”³

As mentioned above, the US has so far been unable to check a rapidly rising China. As Ashley Tellis points out, the rise of China requires policy makers to come to grips with managing the dilemma of sustaining economic interdependence that generates overall growth but produces new geopolitical rivals to US primacy.⁴ Indeed, Chinese political, military, and economic ambitions are challenging the US liberal international order, forcing the US to reconsider its interaction and integration within the Asia Pacific region. According to Hugh White, “If America tries to preserve the status quo and avoid fundamental change in the relationship; it will be choosing to accept China as a strategic rival.”⁵ Change is a major component of life; it is as perennial as the grass.

¹ Christopher Layne, “Rethinking American Grand Strategy,” *World Policy Journal*, 15, no. 2 (1998): 25.

² Elbridge Colby, *Grand Strategy: Contending Contemporary Analyst Views and Implications for the U.S. Navy*, CNA Report CRM D0025423.A2/Final (Alexandria, VA: CNA, November 2011), 10.

³ Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 13.

⁴ Tellis, Ashley J. “The United States and Asia’s Rising Giants,” in *Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers: China and India*, ed. Travis Tanner and Jessica Keough (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011), 3.

⁵ Hugh White, *The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power* (Collingwood, Australia: Black, Inc., 2012), 4.

As the US draws down its forces in Afghanistan and explores solutions to its fiscal problems, the conditions exist to rethink and thus make a comprehensive change to its grand strategy. The constant presence of land forces in Europe and Asia is expensive and induces risk because the US is sitting in the middle of regional security dilemmas, being drawn in regardless of whether it threatens national interests or not. As Stephen Walt states, "The United States today needs much more cost-efficient ways to influence geopolitics in Asia than keeping troops there indefinitely. We need to better leverage the natural competitions in this region to our ends. There is more than one way to play The Great Game, and we need to learn it."⁶ The presence of these forces limits the ability to allow other states to check a potential threat or stabilize the situation. US presence makes them a part of the issue by default. However, a shift to a different grand strategy may offer the US an opportunity to maintain or even better its relative position.

A shift to an offshore balancing grand strategy aligns with the recently announced pivot to the Asia Pacific region⁷; it ensures the US is able to economize expenditures at home and abroad, it shifts burdens to other countries in the region (buck-passing), it reduces risk, and allows the US to improve its global standing.⁸ Ultimately, an offshore balancing grand strategy provides the US the ability to maintain its relative position in the 21st century more effectively than its current strategy concerning China.

This strategy aims to conserve American power as it deals with the challenges of a rising China. Japan and India are both states that could

⁶ Stephen M. Walt, "Offshore Balancing: An Idea Whose Time Has Come," *Foreign Policy Blogs*, November 2, 2011, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/02/offshore_balancing_an_idea_whose_time_has_come.

⁷ Barack Obama, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, January 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf (accessed 12 November 2012).

⁸ Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," *International Security* 22, no. 1 (July 1997): 112.

play a significant role in America's adoption of this strategy, because Japan and India are significant powers in the Asia region. The time has come for the US to get "balance" back into the lexicon of grand strategy. Offshore balancing fulfills the function of any good strategy for policymakers by taking discrete issues such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, trade policy, and defense budget and weaving them into a coherent framework.⁹ The political and military utility of such a grand strategy provides an alternative to defend American perceived interests while maintaining a security framework favorable for interdependence.¹⁰

Offshore Balancing

To understand the benefits of offshore balancing as a compelling strategy for the 21st century, it is essential to understand the different approaches offered by two foremost scholars regarding this strategy, Christopher Layne and John Mearsheimer. While both scholars argue the US should adopt this strategy, they have slightly different viewpoints about America's current position in the world. This is critical, as it determines how America would implement the strategy.

Christopher Layne is a neorealist and believes the US is an extraregional or global hegemon,¹¹ yet his approach has many similarities to defensive realism. He believes that domestic politics can influence foreign policy, allowing a nation to destabilize a threat and seek other diplomatic means before resorting to force. As such, he believes US policymakers can signal their intentions prior to taking action against another state instead of seeking power maximization all the time. Neorealist believe grand strategies result from systemic factors—especially distribution of power in the international system—as well as

⁹ Layne, *Rethinking American Grand Strategy*, 8.

¹⁰ For more information, see Christopher Layne, *From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing*, 98.

¹¹ Layne, *The Peace of Illusions*, 3.

domestic dynamics.¹² Layne believes domestic issues influence the adoption of offshore balancing by the US. This is a prescient concept, considering the current fiscal environment, and the American populace's attitudes regarding future foreign policy after ten years of fighting two wars abroad. Layne believes the US' current hegemonic strategy does not bolster security; it actually renders the US less secure. Hegemonic strategies are ambitious, expensive and the strategy has been unable to prevent the rise of potential hegemons, a fundamental characteristic of such a strategy.

Christopher Layne provides three reasons why a hegemonic strategy is not as effective as an offshore balancing one. First, over time new great powers will emerge. Offshore balancing would allow the US to maintain its relative position in a multi-polar world, while a hegemonic strategy would provoke a geopolitical backlash as other nations seek to counter-balance the US, resulting in imperial overstretch. Second, US hegemony fuels terrorism against the US by groups like Al Qaeda. Christopher Layne believes the events of 9/11 are a reminder of the asymmetric threats created and executed to diminish or destroy American preeminence. Finally, Layne states, "Until new poles of power emerge to offset US military preponderance, the US will succumb to the "hegemon's temptation"—employing its formidable military capabilities promiscuously and becoming entangled in conflicts that it could avoid."¹³

Layne takes direct aim at the central assumption that has undergirded America's grand strategy since 1945, what he calls "Open Door" diplomacy. According to Layne, the Open Door incorporates economic expansion and ideological expansion that created new interests linked to national security.¹⁴ This economic and ideological expansion led to enforcement of US policy objectives by projecting military force

¹² Layne, *The Peace of Illusions*, 8.

¹³ Layne, *The Peace of Illusions*, 6-7.

¹⁴ Layne, *The Peace of Illusions*, 7.

abroad, thereby stimulating US policymakers to define threats not only based on national interests but as threats to American core values. Layne posits the basis of this assumption as the US' believing it must employ the full panoply of its power—military, economic, and ideological—on the international system to shape its external environment.¹⁵ John Mearsheimer provides a slightly different perspective.

Mearsheimer, an offensive realist, contends great powers tend to dominate their regional system (Europe or North East Asia, e.g.), but unless a state achieves clear-cut nuclear superiority, it is virtually impossible for it to achieve global hegemony.¹⁶ This is a defining difference between Mearsheimer and Layne. Mearsheimer also claims, “Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power.”¹⁷ Mearsheimer's drive toward hegemony is another critical difference between the two scholars, since Layne tends to believe hegemonic stability has led to the hegemon's temptation. Mearsheimer believes there never has been and it would be almost impossible for a state to become a global hegemon.

Offensive realism is a subset of the Realist theory of international relations. Offensive realists believe states maximize their power and influence at their rival's expense. The bedrock of Mearsheimer's version of offshore balancing would rest on what he calls “buck-passing”. A buck-passer tries to get another great power to check the aggressor while the great power remains on the sidelines. The magnitude of the threat

¹⁵ Layne, *The Peace of Illusions*, 7.

¹⁶ For more information on offensive realism, see John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 4.

¹⁷ Layne, *The Peace of Illusions*, 35.

and a country's geographical distance relative to the threat determine the degree to which great powers buck-pass.¹⁸

According to Mearsheimer, threatened states usually prefer buck-passing, mainly because it avoids the costs of fighting the aggressor in the event of war.¹⁹ Furthermore, Mearsheimer believes that despite the US' unmatched great power status, it does not intend to conquer and control those distant regions, mainly because of the stopping power of water.²⁰ Bodies of water serve as significant obstacles to any nation. Many of the great powers lack the power projection capability to put land forces ashore. Mearsheimer's offensive realist argument rests on the structure of the international system, not the particular characteristics of individual great powers; this structure causes great powers to think and act offensively and seek hegemony.²¹ A definition of offshore balancing provides deeper understanding of Layne's version of offshore balancing.

Layne's version of offshore balancing directly challenges Mearsheimer's version; specifically, Layne contends the US is more than the "regional hegemon" Mearsheimer suggests.²² Layne states, "United States expansion did not stop at the water's edge. Rather, as Mary Ann Heiss observes, 'as the twentieth century dawned' the United States was 'ready to use its new position [as a regional hegemon] as a springboard for expanding its influence and interests to other areas.'"²³ The difference is subtle between both theorists' approach to offshore balancing, but Layne believes the US is actually a global hegemon, given America's current military capability, economic capacity, and its ability to fight two wars simultaneously. Comparatively, Mearsheimer believes the US is a regional hegemon as it is virtually impossible for any state to be a global hegemon based on the resources and clear-cut nuclear superiority

¹⁸ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 267.

¹⁹ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 139.

²⁰ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 41.

²¹ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 53.

²² Layne, *The Peace of Illusions*, 3.

²³ Layne, *The Peace of Illusions*, 3.

required to do so. Another area of divergence between Mearsheimer and Layne is Mearsheimer's claim that this not so new strategy has been employed since the US became a great power—the end of World War II.²⁴

While both Layne and Mearsheimer's versions of offshore balancing are sufficient and the differences subtle enough for the examination of the research question, Layne's version of offshore balancing will underpin the rest of this paper, unless otherwise specified. Layne's version underpins the paper because his approach appears to favor and accept that a defensive balance allows states to maximize relative power to achieve its national security. This version is of more importance considering the past ten years of continuous conflict, which suggests alternatives that are less offensive minded may be the way forward for some time, unless America is faced with an existential threat at some point prior to implementing this kind of strategy. Layne contends offshore balancing is a realist balance-of-power grand strategy deduced from international relations theory and defined by five key objectives:

1. It is a strategy for an emerging multipolar world.
2. The US will find it increasingly more difficult, dangerous, and costly to maintain order in, and control over, the international political system.
3. The strategy prevents the rise of a Eurasian hegemon.
4. The US would be able to disengage from its military commitments in Europe, Japan, and South Korea.
5. The overriding objectives of an offshore balancing strategy would insulate the US from future great power wars and maximize its relative power position in the international system.²⁵

Additionally, the strategy would maximize military-technology advantages in order to facilitate strategic flexibility. In January 2012,

²⁴ Layne, *The Peace of Illusions*, 23.

²⁵ Layne, *From Preponderance To Offshore Balancing*, 105.

the US Secretary of Defense published a portion of *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, a document providing strategic guidance to the Joint Force. Two specific areas highlight the military-technology advantages that are essential to sustaining US leadership. First, the Joint Force must be able to project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges of the 21st century. Specifically, the military will continue to invest in undersea capabilities, develop a new stealth bomber, improve missile defenses and continue efforts to enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities.²⁶

Second, modern armed forces must be able to operate effectively in cyberspace and space. The Secretary of Defense's guidance in this area states the Department of Defense will continue to invest in advanced capabilities to defend its networks, operational capability, and resiliency in cyberspace and space.²⁷ All of these capabilities are ideal for implementing a balance of power strategy like offshore balancing. As the US seeks to protect its economic vitality and conducts a responsible draw down from two wars, an offshore balancing strategy aligns with both the changing geopolitical environment and the Secretary of Defense's strategic direction to sustain US global leadership.

As the US retracts ground forces from two overseas engagements, it further reflects a core principle of offshore balancing. Having fewer troops overseas reduces the risk of being involved in future major wars. This stems from the fact that foreign occupiers produce resentment in many cases.²⁸ Furthermore, the geopolitically insular position of the US allows for flexibility such as buck-passing or bystanding as problems arise. However, if America's vital interests are at stake, the deployment or redeployment of troops to the region remains the prime option of an

²⁶ Obama, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, 5.

²⁷ Obama, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, 5

²⁸ John J. Mearsheimer, "Middle East: Know the Limits of U.S. Power," *Newsweek Magazine*, November 29, 2008,

<http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/11/28/middle-east-know-the-limits-of-u-s-power.html>.

offshore balancer. The introduction or reintroduction of air, naval or ground forces would take place if threats by a rising hegemon were detrimental to US interests. This strategy does not espouse leaving our partners or allies to go at it alone, it does suggest they must do more for their own security in the region. If the US reduces overseas commitments and retracts its current security umbrella, the US must retain substantial military forces stateside or offshore with forcible entry capabilities that can sustain operations away from garrison, in order to hold or wrest territory away from an adversary.²⁹

The modern security environment offers many challenges and the US should seek to balance its resources and interests to reflect these challenges. Layne's offshore balancing strategy offers a compelling alternative US grand strategy in Asia. He posits, "The United States enjoys no privileged exemption from the fate of hegemons...since 1990 this has included soft and hard balancing, and terrorism...but, in China's case, a determined effort at hard balancing against American hegemony by building up its military capabilities."³⁰ Richard Ellings states, "For the past decade China has been rapidly modernizing its military capabilities through a combination of indigenous development, foreign purchases, and major improvements in doctrine, education and training. Military planners of the People's Liberation Army have focused primarily on capabilities designed both to pressure Taiwan and to counter third parties, especially the US, in a cross-Strait conflict."³¹ Yet the offshore balancing strategy has not appealed to everyone; there are many objections to implementing this kind of grand strategy.

Popular objections against an offshore balancing grand strategy include increasing the risk of US involvement in a major war. Layne

²⁹ Elbridge Colby, *Grand Strategy: Contending Contemporary Analyst Views and Implications for the U.S. Navy*, 6.

³⁰ Layne, *The Peace of Illusions*, 157.

³¹ Richard J. Ellings. "Preface," in *Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty* ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), iv.

claims that by decreasing the geopolitical and military footprint on the ground in the Middle East, the US can reduce the incidence of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism directed against it.³² In addition, the current strategy of hegemony has costs that exceed its benefits.³³ If the basis of a hegemonic strategy is to prevent other hegemons from rising, then this strategy has failed, considering China's meteoric rise over the past decade. However, as will be shown, the benefits of reducing risk, shifting burdens and maintaining US relative power position in the 21st century will far outweigh the costs of adopting and implementing offshore balancing.

Several theoretical assumptions are required in order to highlight the dynamics of the strategy. When great powers chose between (or among) alternative grand strategies, the most important question is which is likely to provide the most security.³⁴ One major assumption of offshore balancing is that the US would be more secure after withdrawing its security umbrella from overseas allies, forcing these states to assume more of the defensive burden and thereby increasing America's overall strategic position.³⁵ Retracting the security umbrella reduces risk (gets other states to do more for their security so the US can do less), decreases expenditures and provides flexibility to exercise diplomatic options without the inherent commitment.

Adoption of this strategy, however, assumes Japan and India possess the material (military, economic, and technical) capabilities to balance against threats and defend themselves. As China continues to grow its military, economy, and technical capabilities, other states in the region would thus have to balance against a potential regional

³² Christopher Layne, "The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing," *The National Interest*, January 27, 2012, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405>.

³³ Layne, *The Peace of Illusions*, 110.

³⁴ Layne, *The Peace of Illusions*, 7.

³⁵ Layne, *From Preponderance To Offshore Balancing*, 109.

hegemon.³⁶ In adopting this strategy, the US must also accept that some (preferably managed) nuclear proliferation is likely inevitable as balancing occurs. By assisting potential balancers through the nuclear proliferation process, the US is in a better position to ensure proper oversight of these programs. Simply, the US will need to help balancers gain the appropriate nuclear capabilities to be credible balancers in the region and it would offer access into their programs that the US might not otherwise have if these balancers were to develop the capability independently.

Economics has played a crucial role in victory and defeat in the modern era of industrial and technological warfare. As an offshore balancer, the US could use the security competition that would most likely occur in Europe and Asia to its advantage. Layne states, “An offshore balancing strategy would be grounded on the assumption that relative economic power matters. Domestic economic revitalization and a neo-mercantilist international economic policy would be integral components of the strategy.”³⁷ Layne goes on to say, “The US is well placed to adopt an insular grand strategy because it can diversify its export markets; it can minimize its reliance on overseas raw materials (including petroleum) by stockpiling, diversification, and substitution; and external trade is a relatively small component of its gross domestic product (GDP).”³⁸

Finally, the strategy rests on the belief that concrete vital interests should determine US commitments both domestically and abroad.³⁹ Credibility should not determine commitments and commitments should not determine interests. These assumptions are prudent when making strategic decisions to accept an alternative strategy to shift burdens or buck-pass to other states in the region. With the lexicon of the offshore

³⁶ Layne, *From Preponderance To Offshore Balancing*, 106.

³⁷ Layne, *From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing*, 106.

³⁸ Layne, *From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing*, 106.

³⁹ Layne, *From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing*, 107.

balancing strategy fully established, an examination of China's rise and the geostrategic picture of the region provide perspective regarding the role of the balancer in the region.

China's Patterns of Behavior

A future US relationship with China represents more than just a hard choice since the implications of this relationship for the region are momentous. China's rise is the hallmark of the "Asian Century" namely because of China's great power potential: a large territory, vast resources, and a huge population.⁴⁰ Hugh White, a leading Asian affairs expert, cogently lays out the impact of America's choices about China. His insights on the US-China relationship are instructive in understanding China's rise and its attempts to influence other states in the region through its patterns of behavior. White contends that for forty years Chinese acceptance of America's superior power underpinned the Asian strategic order.⁴¹ The context of this idea rests on China's acceptance of American superior power since Nixon and Mao met in 1972. At the time, China's economy was one-twentieth the size of America's and lacking strategic choices for parity, China accepted for its own interest this unequal relationship as a temporary expedient.⁴² Yet, because of China's long history, its citizens feel it is exceptional and destined to lead. Many Chinese see the country as a great power deprived of its great power status by other powers.

China's goal is to maintain relationships with other great powers, both distant and within the region. J.V. Singh states, "In particular, recognizing that the US is the world's sole superpower and one of China's key providers of capital, technology, and market, China cannot afford to have an irreparable rupture in its relationship with the US."⁴³ This

⁴⁰ Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), ix.

⁴¹ White, *The China Choice*, 3.

⁴² White, *The China Choice*, 3.

⁴³ Singh, "Interpreting China's Grand Strategy," *Air Power Journal* 6, no. 1 (2011): 39.

suggests China will develop a grand strategy to maintain the status quo while trying to “soft balance” against the US. China looks to remain amicable until it achieves enough power to rise to superpower status. Until such time China seeks a non-confrontational approach while pursuing diplomatic coordination with other countries to constrain US actions (soft balancing) harmful to Chinese interests.⁴⁴

Any future balancer in the Asia region must understand the scope of Chinese grand strategy to comprehend China’s intentions for the region. China has four overriding conditions that form a unique set of security problems for both the Asian region and the US. First, China has a long and geographically vulnerable border. A large porous border means China must control or pacify the periphery of its border to protect the homeland. This has the potential to create unforeseen or unwarranted second and third order effects like another border war with India, resulting from access to water as an example. Second, from a Chinese perspective there are many potential threats, both nearby and distant. China exists in a dangerous neighborhood where surrounding states are seeking to balance its rise alongside the threat from abroad (like the US whose security interests in the region clash with the Chinese). Third, China suffers from a domestic political system marked by high-level conflict and weak institutions for mediating and resolving conflict. A focus on leadership politics and leadership personalities has caused corruption and distorted Chinese policy over the years. This dynamic has exacerbated the deep-seated tension between China’s leadership and Chinese society. Finally, China has a great power self-image—it wants other powers to accept this view and therefore treat China as such.⁴⁵

Furthermore, China’s ascent may cause a power transition within the international system that could challenge the US as the region’s

⁴⁴ Singh, *Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy*, 43.

⁴⁵ Swaine and Tellis, *Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy*, 9.

preeminent security provider.⁴⁶ China perceives the US pivot to Asia as an attempt to encircle and contain China. This perceived encirclement leads China to think it will be unable to achieve its desired great power status in the region. According to J. V. Singh, the central objective of China's grand strategy (which may well last until 2050) can be captured in just one sentence: to secure and shape a conducive environment (security, economic, and political) so that China can concentrate on its development (economic, social, and political).⁴⁷

China's security problems and its geographic location led it to adopt a hybrid strategy of regional and global concerns coalesced into what is termed as a "calculative" grand strategy.⁴⁸ Swaine and Tellis define the term "calculative" as such: "In *substantive* terms as a pragmatic approach that emphasizes the primacy of internal economic growth and stability, the nurturing of amicable international relations, the relative restraint in the use of force combined with increasing efforts to create a more modern military and the continued search for asymmetric gains internationally."⁴⁹ The basis of this calculative strategy allows China to grow economically and technologically without any distractions geopolitically. Furthermore, the strategy prevents China from taking on the obligations of great power management, giving China time to work through problems establishing domestic social order and protecting security interests along the periphery. Even though it is a pragmatic approach, China's neighbors and other major powers must consider and plan for when China believes it has enough power to make regional influence attempts both diplomatically and militarily. In order for China to influence others consistently on the international stage, it will have to make many economic and political reforms. China's strategy assumes that economic prosperity and stability will afford it substantial

⁴⁶ Swaine and Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy*, 9.

⁴⁷ Singh, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy*, 38.

⁴⁸ Singh, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy*, 49.

⁴⁹ Swaine and Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy*, 97.

international influence and diplomatic advantage as well as a robust, modern military.⁵⁰

Based on China's patterns of behavior, America will have to make some difficult choices to protect its interests in the region. White claims, "America's choices about China are among the most important and difficult it has ever faced," and America has three options: (1) it can resist China's challenge and preserve the status quo; (2) it can completely step away from its dominant role in Asia, allowing China to make an attempt at hegemony, or (based on the proposed grand-strategic alternative of offshore balancing) (3) it can remain in Asia on a new basis, sharing power with China, while still maintaining a strong regional presence.⁵¹

A crucial aspect of US engagement with China is ensuring it is a more cooperative China, whether it is weak or strong in the future.⁵² The security competition between the US and China is already clear. China espouses a peaceful rise strategy, but its political and military actions suggest a different intent altogether, China's slow attempts at coercing Taiwan, its military modernization (development of aircraft carriers and submarines to support a blue-water navy), and the strategy to increase access to the Indian Ocean Region represent intentions different than the rhetoric from Beijing. An offshore balancing strategy might prevent both sides from crossing the tipping point into conflict. With these three options in mind, a brief understanding of China's military capability will assist in comprehending its intentions and future behavior in the region.

China's Military Capability

A particular focus of the calculative strategy is reducing China's geopolitical vulnerabilities by expanding and modernizing its military forces to achieve diplomatic and political advantages. Its military buildup has been marked with inconsistency, starting in the 1950s with

⁵⁰ Singh, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy*, 32.

⁵¹ White, *The China Choice*, 5.

⁵² Swaine and Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy*, xiii.

its relationship with the Soviets, followed by modernization under Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s. China finally in the 1990s deemed its ground forces obsolete, based on the West's successful use of high-tech weaponry against the Iraqi army.⁵³ The buildup of its nuclear and conventional forces is moving slowly to keep within the parameters of the calculative grand strategy's premise of not alarming its neighbors and other major powers. J.V. Singh contends a sudden military buildup might also detract from China's emphasis on civilian economic development.⁵⁴ Despite China's rhetoric of a peaceful rise, China's neighbors and other major powers should heed its military expansion and modernization.

China's military, the People's Liberation Army, consists of 2,285,000 active duty personnel, making it the largest armed force in the world.⁵⁵ It has 510,000 personnel in its reserve force. The essential organizations within the PLA are its Strategic Missile Forces, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Airborne Corps.⁵⁶ The Chinese built and structured the People's Liberation Army to fight conventional operations, but modernizing is a significant part of how China plans to rethink the use of force in the current and future global environment. China looks to use pinpoint ground attack and anti-ship missiles, a growing and modern naval fleet and cyber and anti-satellite weapons to destroy or disable another nation's military assets from afar.⁵⁷ The idea is to hold at risk adversary bases in the Asian region, thereby deterring aggression by further mitigating power projection capabilities. This conforms to the

⁵³ Editorial, "China's Military Rise," *The Economist*, April 7, 2012, <http://www.economist.com/node/21552193>, 28.

⁵⁴ Singh, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy*, 50.

⁵⁵ *The Military Balance 2012* (London: Routledge, 2012), 233.

⁵⁶ *The Military Balance 2012*, 233–238.

⁵⁷ Editorial, *China's Military Rise*, 27.

anti-access/area denial (A2AD) debates within the development of the US Air Sea Battle concept.⁵⁸

This should cause America alarm since it has several bases in the region and serves as the security guarantor for several regional allies. Dan Blumenthal presents a clear picture of China's intentions and the threat to US national interests in a report that assesses the military balance between the US and China:

A China that can block chokepoints in the South China Sea poses a threat to United States' interest in unimpeded access to critical trade routes in Asia. A China with aircraft carriers (and the logistical support such ships need) can start to project power and gain a measure of sea control, thereby instigating harmful arms races as well as putting at risk US maritime interest. In sum, if China were to realize its military aspirations, it could begin achieve hegemony in one of the world's most critical regions, enabling Beijing, if it chooses, to reshape the international system more to its liking and—for the first time since before the attack on Pearl Harbor—pose a threat to United States from the Pacific.⁵⁹

The purpose of China's future military strategy is to be capable of winning local wars under high-tech conditions.⁶⁰ As China continues to retool its military capability, it will also continue to cause significant issues for the region and the US.

China's Economic Capacity

For China to achieve its desired military expansion and modernization a growing and stable economy must underpin the process. The growth of China's economy has significant implications for the US

⁵⁸ Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at Brookings Institution, provides an excerpt from an opinion editorial in the Washington Post. Air-Sea Battle rightly emphasizes improved command-and-control, precision strike, advanced missile defenses, robotics, submarine operations, and the use of air and space domains. So far, it has not involved big new weapons platforms. Michael O'Hanlon, "Going Beyond 'AirSeaBattle,'" *Washington Post*, 23 August 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/beyond-air-sea-battle-a-military-concept-that-challenges-policymakers/2012/08/23/8fd4f8fa-ed31-11e1-9ddc-340d5efb1e9c_story.html (accessed 28 November 2012).

⁵⁹ Dan Blumenthal, *Sino-U.S. Competition and U.S. Security: How Do We Assess the Military Balance?* (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2010), 19.

⁶⁰ Editorial, *The Economist*, 27.

and world politics. If China's economy continues to grow it will have the capacity to increase and modernize its military capability, resulting in increased power. Scholars and economists have claimed China's ascendancy as a peaceful one. Surely, China's calculative strategy would claim as much. However, can China's neighbors expect it to remain neighborly as it exercises its newly acquired power? History suggests China is likely to cause dangerous currents in the international system as it exercises its power and makes influence attempts to achieve national interests.⁶¹ John Kirshner states, "China's expanding economy will create greater challenges for and frictions with the United States — challenges, because China's economic might will enhance its political influence, which will increasingly frustrate some US foreign policy efforts; frictions, because the importance of China's economy will exacerbate not easily resolved international macro-economic conflicts, adding a new source of tension to Asia-Pacific international relations generally."⁶² How China's rise will continue to affect international politics is uncertain, but there is no doubt China's economy will continue to increase.

China has sustained substantial economic growth year after year, resulting in it being a pillar of the global economy and a critical component of global economic growth.⁶³ It is the third largest trading nation in the world. China requires a large amount of resources, which it lacks, causing it to interact with many countries in the world. China's political power structure has been increasing since the 1970s, based on economic reforms instituted by Deng Xiaoping.⁶⁴ Deng's economic reforms propelled China forward, allowing it to evolve and replace its socialist economic initiatives with capitalistic market principles.

⁶¹ Jonathon Kirshner, "The Consequences of China's Economic Rise for Sino-U.S. Relations," in *China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*, eds. Robert S Ross and Feng Zhu (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 238.

⁶² Kirshner, *China's Ascent*, 238.

⁶³ Kirshner, *China's Ascent*, 240.

⁶⁴ Singh, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy*, 29.

According to Michael Swaine and Ashley Tellis, “Deng Xiaoping’s transformation produced revolutionary improvements in Chinese growth rates, patterns and volumes of manufacturing and trade, personal income levels, state revenues, foreign exchange earnings, and levels of technology all of which taken together portend and qualitative increase in national capabilities and, if continued over many decades, a shift in the regional and global balance of power.”⁶⁵ China has economic ties with states in the Asian region, the oil producing countries of the Middle East, states in Africa that provide natural resources, and several countries in Latin and South America. Kirschner portends that China’s economic attraction, especially as a source of demand for foreign exports but also as a magnet for foreign investment, will translate into greater political influence for China.⁶⁶

Threatening China’s economic growth are its underlying domestic issues, demographic shifts, social dislocations, and internal unrest. Swaine and Tellis assert extensive structural and procedural reforms are required in the tax, fiscal, banking and legal areas to begin correcting the problems.⁶⁷ Furthermore, the further liberalization of foreign investment practices, trade, currency convertibility and environmental protection measures increase continued long-term growth for China.⁶⁸ However, internal corruption and poor leadership continue to threaten China’s growth as a world power.

This is more than just forecasting coercive actions; it is about influence as well. China’s growing economic role will translate into what Joseph Nye calls “soft power”. Soft power underlies a state’s ability not to force others to do what you want, but getting them to want what you want them to want.⁶⁹ Even though China’s ascent is remarkable, China’s

⁶⁵ Swaine and Tellis, *Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy*, 98.

⁶⁶ Kirshner, *China’s Ascent*, 241.

⁶⁷ Swaine and Tellis, *Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy*, 99.

⁶⁸ Swaine and Tellis, *Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy*, 99.

⁶⁹ Kirshner, *China’s Ascent*, 242.

regional neighbors view this rise with a cautious eye. Moreover, China is still afraid of complete modernization, such as open internet access to its populace and trade reforms that would allow China to embrace aspects of globalization. Any country that may play the role of future balancer will have to contend with the dynamics of China's grand strategy, military capabilities, and economic rise if they plan to balance effectively against China's ascendancy.

Background

What would future offshore balancing look like in the Asian theater and what should the US expect of a balancer in the region? This research seeks to not only define this grand strategy but also show its viability. Furthermore, the strategy should effectively outline US objectives and the guidance on how to achieve those objectives. While this paper assumes the US would adopt such a strategy, an understanding of how a historical equivalent has worked in the past is informative in understanding its worth in the contemporary security environment. A historical equivalent of an offshore balancing strategy can also validate it as an effective strategy. While the modern security environment will differ from any historical example analyzed, lessons learned from historical analysis will provide a useful framework for its applicability.

In addition, this research will seek to understand how viable a "free-floating" Japan or India could be. Considering Japan and India's current relationships in the region and internationally, their historical narratives are certain to have a profound influence on their role as balancers in the Asia Pacific region. Ultimately, states' military capability and economic capacity determine their ability to influence distribution of power and security.

Methodology

Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver's Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) provides the theoretical underpinning of this thesis. The main

purpose of the theory is to provide explanatory power and some level of predictability in patterns of behavior for actors within the Asian region. The theory combines a materialist and constructivist approach. Underpinning the former are neorealist ideas of bounded territoriality and distribution of power dynamics; that is, states drive for power and security within an anarchic international system.⁷⁰ Reinforcing the latter approach is the constructivist concept of securitization, which focuses on the political process by which security issues are constituted and established within the international system.⁷¹ Regional Security Complex Theory offers explanatory power and some limited predictability concerning patterns of behavior of Japan and India, explaining how each state might behave as the balancer in the region. Buzan and Wæver present three levels of analysis: domestic, regional and global.

This multifaceted theory has three central components: Regional Security Complexes (RSC), securitization and desecuritization. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver define RSC as, “A set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another.”⁷² Moreover, RSC supports the idea that geographic proximity between states that make up regionally based clusters (security complexes) are more likely to react to internal threats within their immediate region than from external ones.

America’s adoption of offshore balancing would heavily rely on this aspect of the theory. According to Buzan, “The logic of security regions stems from the fact that international security is a relational matter. International security is mostly about how human collectives relate to each other in terms of threats and vulnerabilities, although sometimes it

⁷⁰ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: A Guide to the Global Security Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 4.

⁷¹ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 4.

⁷² Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 12.

addresses the ways such collectives relate to threats from the natural environment.”⁷³ This emphasizes that the RSC is a relational matter influencing states through the amity and enmity that exist between them. These relationships determine whether states adopt securitization or desecuritization measures within a region.

Securitization is another core component of RSCT. It is constructivist because it is not concerned whether an issue is or is not itself a threat, but focuses on the surrounding conditions of when and who securitizes what issue.⁷⁴ What matters is not whether a threat actually exists, only that the populace accepts the perceived threat as such. When policymakers make a public speech, the government has conducted a security move, but it is not securitization until the populace accepts the premise of the speech as an existential threat. Therefore, existential threats are legitimate only if the populace believes the object threatened is actually a danger as expressed by their government. Securitization helps to determine the differences between security and routine politics.⁷⁵

Because regional security policy determines how a government will interact with adjacent governments in the region, states must pay close attention to what other governments say and how the populace responds. The premise underlying societal security is the interplay between referent objects (that which are to be secured) and securitizing actors (those who make claims about security).⁷⁶ Securitization supports RSCT in that an actor securitizes against some threat on behalf of a referent object. Securitizing actors identifying an issue as an existential threat form the basis of balance of power relationships and the causal dynamics of security policy. An example of the government acting as a

⁷³ Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*, 10.

⁷⁴ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 71.

⁷⁵ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, xvi.

⁷⁶ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 71.

securitizing actor can be found in President Barack Obama's speech to the Department of Defense where he states:

Indeed, as we end today's wars, we will focus on a broader range of challenges and opportunities, including the security and prosperity of the Asia Pacific. As a new generation across the Middle East and North Africa demands their universal rights, we are supporting political and economic reform and deepening partnerships to ensure regional security. In contrast to the murderous vision of violent extremists, we are joining with allies and partners around the world to build their capacity to promote security, prosperity, and human dignity. And the growing capabilities of allies and partners, as demonstrated in the successful mission to protect the Libyan people, create new opportunities for burden sharing.⁷⁷

President Obama's speech at the Pentagon established the continued existential threat of violent extremists. It appears the American populace accepted that violent extremists are a threat, so the next step is for the US to take action or take desecuritization measures instead.

Desecuritization is the opposite of securitization and it is the last major component of RSCT. Buzan and Wæver define desecuritization as, "a process by which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat."⁷⁸ For example: state A considers states B's expansion in the region as a threat to its economic interests. If state C balances against state B, then state A can downgrade or cease to treat the expansion by state B as a threat to its economic interests.

A synthesis of data sets makes available a qualitative descriptive analysis of Japan and India's military capabilities and economic capacities. The military and economic variables play a decisive role in

⁷⁷ Obama, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*

⁷⁸ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 489.

determining a state's ability to play the role of balancer of a particular region.

Three case studies (Britain, Japan, and India) serve as the primary framework to explain the viability of switching to an offshore balancing strategy. A blend of Regional Security Complex Theory and qualitative descriptive analysis elucidate the independent variables to answer the research question. A historiography of Britain's use of foreign policy underpinned by its military capability and economic capacity during "Pax Britannica" (1815-1914) demonstrates the validity of the strategy. The Japanese and Indian case studies examine both an insular and continental powers' potential to play (respectively) the role of balancer in the Asian region, especially when supported by their particular patterns of behavior, military capability, and economic capacity.

Statement of the Research Question and its Significance

One important, albeit overlooked, element of this offshore balancing strategy is who will play the role of the balancer in the Asian region; this thesis also seeks to answer that question. The selection of Japan and India as possible balancers offers a unique framework for answering this question. The US has a strong alliance with Japan and serves as its security guarantor in the region. Japan maintains a self-defense force but it is limited in what it can truly achieve from a security perspective. Japan also has a vibrant and strong economy with a defined middle class. Finally, Japan is an insular nation that has been a great power in the past and benefits from the stopping power of water. Japan would have to decide, if it were to lose the American security umbrella, on whether it should acquire nuclear weapons. However, Japan's historical narrative could make some states in the region nervous, considering its actions prior to and during World War II.

India does not have defined alliances with the US, but it does possess a modern military to protect its security interests. India has a growing economy, a rapidly growing population, a burgeoning middle

class, and multiple environmental issues. As of the late 1990s, India became a nuclear state, instantly gaining great power respect as a member of the nuclear club. However, India must contend with a nuclear Pakistan that serves as its neighbor, compounding its issues as a continental power. India must solve its numerous internal problems (rising population, environmental problems, and corruption in governmental politics) and external challenges before deciding to serve as an effective balancer.

As the US pivots towards Asia, Japan instead of India could more effectively play the role of balancer based upon patterns of behavior, potential military capability, and economic capacity within an offshore balancing grand strategy focused on Asia. As will be shown later in this essay, Japan is likely to make the better choice for this role.

Chapter 2

Pax Britannica: Historical Perspective of Offshore Balancing

The United Kingdom has also followed an offshore balancing strategy. As Sire Eyre Crowe noted in his famous 1907 memorandum about British security policy, “It has become almost a historical truism to identify England’s secular policy with maintenance of this [European] balance by throwing her weight... on the side opposed to the political dictatorship of the strongest single state.”

John J. Mearsheimer

Historical Background

For those who would govern, selecting the right strategy requires a reflection of the past to assist with envisioning alternative futures. While America’s current grand strategy has been profitable, a realist view teaches that relative power and position in the international arena is not enduring. All states decline at some point, but selecting a strategy that either mitigates this decline or advances one’s position is the key to any grand strategy. During the zenith of Britain’s power, known as Pax Britannica or the peace of Britain (1815-1914), is found a historical example of an effective offshore balancing grand strategy. During these hundred years of peace, Britain enjoyed the status of being the dominant great power. This case study provides the historical underpinnings of offshore balancing and highlights the dynamics of Britain’s role as a great power within the European Regional Security Complex (RSC).

As stated earlier, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver define a Regional Security Complex as “A set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems

cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.”¹ This concept revolves around the idea that threats travel much easier over short distances, thereby patterning security interdependence into regionally based clusters.² Despite the relevance of global influence in international affairs, every state has to manage power distribution and interact with the amity and enmity it has constructed toward countries within its regional security complex. Britain not only accomplished this balance of power feat, it did so as it became the largest empire of all time.

According to Buzan and Wæver’s Regional Security Complex Theory, Great Britain was indeed a great power during this era, based on their criteria. First, Britain had just defeated another great power, France, in the Napoleonic Wars. Second, Britain had the material capability, both economically and militarily, to assume great power status. This point is critical because RSCT has elements of both a constructivist and materialist approach. The two approaches allowed the British to frame threat and vulnerabilities concerning its interests and to coerce its adversaries by force. Finally, Britain had the formal recognition of great power status by the other great powers within the region. To gain a greater understanding of the usefulness of this historical offshore balancing strategy, further examination of Pax Britannica within the regional and global security environment is required.

The regional and global security environment of the nineteenth century provides a unique setting to examine a historic offshore balancing case. The author recognizes this study does not exactly fit Layne’s modern definition and characteristics of offshore balancing, nor is it a perfect example to apply Buzan and Wæver’s RSCT. However, its close resemblance to offshore balancing is instructive in analyzing its

¹ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 12.

² Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*, 15.

advantages and disadvantages as a grand strategy. Scholars consider Britain's grand strategy during the nineteenth century as a close representation of what offshore balancing could achieve in the modern era. A nuclear arsenal, modern air force, and adequate ground forces facilitate a modern offshore balancer's ability to conduct forcible entry actions, a requirement if a regional hegemon ascends and upsets the regional balance.³ Great Britain lacked a nuclear deterrent capability, an air force, and substantial ground forces in the nineteenth century.

However, the British leveraged their naval supremacy (high technology of the era), ground forces (employed primarily offshore) and economic capacity (dominant economy) to balance the Concert of Europe and achieve similar goals sought by the contemporary offshore balancer. Christopher Layne's core principles of offshore balancing illustrate some similarities in the British example and a modern offshore balancer when he points out, "Fiscal and economic constraints require that the United States set strategic priorities. Accordingly, the country should withdraw or downsize its forces in Europe and the Middle East and concentrate its military power in East Asia. America's comparative strategic advantages rest on naval and air power, not on sending land armies to fight ground wars in Eurasia. Thus the United States should opt for the strategic precepts of Alfred Thayer Mahan (the primacy of air and sea power) over those of Sir Halford Mackinder (the primacy of land power)."⁴ The similarities in the core principles and employment of military assets by the British and the modern offshore balancer are striking despite difference in respective centuries.

³ Elbridge Colby, "Grand Strategy: Contending Contemporary Analyst Views and Implications for the U.S. Navy" (Center for Naval Analyses, November 2011), 7, <http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Grand%20Strategy%20Implications%20for%20the%20U.S.%20Navy%20D0025423%20A2%20with%20metadata.pdf>.

⁴ Christopher Layne, "The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing," *The National Interest*, January 27, 2012, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405>.

Furthermore, Buzan and Wæver's RSCT is mainly interpretive for regional security complexes in the Post-Cold War era. According to Buzan and Wæver, "One could think of Europe during this period (nineteenth century) as a regional security complex but, being composed largely of great powers, and being in effect the only one, it was of a very special kind. For the European imperial powers, the world was their region."⁵ Diminishing imperial power and decolonization created many new states that allowed regional security dynamics to flourish, thereby making RSCT more suitable for the Post-Cold War era. Regardless of this difference in periods, it does not invalidate the case study or the application of RSCT within it.

Applying RSCT to the British historiography of Pax Britannica should explain patterns of behavior and validate the offshore balancing strategy. Incorporation of this same methodological approach will be crucial (to ensure consistency) in the subsequent case studies of Japan and India. By focusing on the British historiography of Pax Britannica, the author attempts not only to validate this historical representation of an offshore balancing strategy, but also to identify the parameters required by a potential modern-day balancer to make the strategy effective.

Paul Kennedy says, "Pax Britannica was a three-sided equation that consisted of an expanding formal empire together with a larger informal empire both of which provided raw materials and markets for the British economy; an adequate and overwhelming navy, and an industrial revolution that poured British products into the rest of the world."⁶ Analysis of Britain's patterns of behavior (within the formal and informal empire), its military capability and economic capacity in this three-sided equation reveals the locus of conflict and cooperation

⁵ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: A Guide to the Global Security Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15.

⁶ Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2006), 157.

between Britain and other states, both regionally and globally. Britain's foreign policy of "Splendid Isolation," an offshore balancing equivalent, elucidates their regional patterns of behavior in the nineteenth century.

Regional Patterns of Behavior

An effective way to analyze the British Empire's Splendid Isolation strategy during Pax Britannica is to think of it in terms of patterns of behavior manifested through its foreign policy. The reference to regional patterns of behavior in this chapter incorporates British domestic politics as well. A brief description of the British Empire assists with putting the patterns of behavior into context. The British Empire was broken down into both "formal" and "informal" areas. The formal empire of Britain consisted not only of the land mass that comprises the modern day United Kingdom, but also any colony, self-governing Dominion, protectorate or mandate.⁷ *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire* refers to the informal empire as areas that British influence extended beyond the bounds of the formal empire.⁸

Splendid Isolation was a popular conception of Great Britain's regional pattern of behavior, or foreign policy, during Pax Britannica.⁹ The nineteenth century strategy of Splendid Isolation is synonymous with the contemporary offshore balancing strategy. Splendid isolation and offshore balancing as grand strategies allow a state to achieve four similar goals:

1. A reduced defense budget
2. A reduction of risk (insulation from great power wars)
3. An ability to shift burdens via buck-passing and assumption of a bystander posture

⁷ P. J. Marshall, *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire*, ed. P. J. Marshall (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 11.

⁸ Marshall, *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire*, 11.

⁹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2003).

4. An ability to maintain or increase its relative power position¹⁰

These criteria underpinned Britain's splendid isolation grand strategy; in this same way, the criteria would also underpin a US adoption of an offshore balancing grand strategy.

Interestingly, Nigel Jones summarizes this era, stating "For another century, the 19th, Britain, ruling the world's waves, was content to mind its business on Europe's sidelines, enjoying what the great Victorian statesman Lord Salisbury called *splendid isolation*, concentrating on getting rich with Victorian industry, and extending its empire until it ruled one quarter of the globe."¹¹ The United Kingdom did well to avoid major engagements, especially those that might have led to land war, unless her full weight could prevent the scales from tipping on the side of the strongest single state.¹² British retrenchment after the Napoleonic War illustrates the characteristics of an offshore balancing strategy. Namely, Britain's grand strategy of splendid isolation conserved Britain's power as it faced the potential rise of other European great powers.

It is important to acknowledge that within an anarchic security structure, some security actions may result in positive or negative consequences concerning the RSC. As previously noted, from a realist perspective a state cannot sustain dominance forever; states develop alliances to balance against a hegemon. Britain enjoyed many years of near hegemonic rule during the peace of Britain. Ultimately, Britain suffered from gradual decline as David Reynolds states, "Rather than the Pax Britannica sustaining an era of European peace, it was peace which sustained the Pax. Indeed Britain was almost a *free rider*—allowed to

¹⁰ Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," *International Security* 22, no. 1 (July 1997): 87.

¹¹ Nigel Jones, "Very Well, Alone! Splendid Isolation Has Always Been Britain's Default Position," *Mail Online*, December 11, 2011, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2072813/EU-treaty-veto-Splendid-isolation-Britains-default-position.html#ixzz2IOcu8D00>.

¹² Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 261.

concentrate its resources on global expansion because of the European equilibrium. When continental states chose once more to use war as an instrument of policy—with the unification of Italy and Germany in the 1860s—Britain could do little to affect the outcome.”¹³ Despite Britain’s eventual decline, the Splendid Isolation strategy provided Britain with enormous wealth and power, but if a state remains aloof to relational dynamics within the region, the potential negative consequences can lead to decline or loss of relative position. No strategy is perfect but this British strategy undoubtedly increased Britain’s power, wealth, and security.

Britain’s regional dynamics influenced the adoption of a Splendid Isolation grand strategy because the British felt it was a way to maintain the status quo. Grand strategy underlies the nexus of politics and military strategy and thus contains elements of both, but a state assumes risk in any strategy because the anarchic structure of the security environment is uncertain and ambiguous.¹⁴ Williamson Murray posits, “One does not make effective grand strategy entirely as one would like but rather according to the circumstances in which a national polity finds itself.”¹⁵ Consequently, the British were bound to deal with the unique security circumstances within the European region.

According to Buzan, “The logic of security regions stems from the fact that international security is a relational matter.”¹⁶ State’s relations manifest as public speeches from policymakers to their populace to indicators potential existential threats and vulnerabilities to their interests. A simple speech by the government is the first move in determining if a specific object is a threat or vulnerability. Therefore,

¹³ David Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Powers in the 20th Century* (Essex, UK: Longman, 2000), 18.

¹⁴ Williamson Murray, “Thoughts on Grand Strategy,” in *The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War*, eds. Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, and Jim Lacey (Cambridge; NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 8.

¹⁵ Murray, *The Shaping of Grand Strategy*, 7.

¹⁶ Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*, 10.

existential threats are legitimate only if the populace believes the object threatened is actually a danger as expressed by their government. Regions matter most because of the close interactions among the nations. Therefore, as Britain's power declined they began to focus on balance of power theory. Because regional security policy determines how a government will interact with adjacent governments in the region, states must pay close attention to what other governments say and how the populace responds.

The region is the most important unit of analysis because geographical proximity matters between two or more interacting polities. Britain's most salient security interests focus on issues and actors in close proximity to them and most states do not have the capacity to project force beyond their existing region.¹⁷ The most important states of the European RSC during the nineteenth century consisted of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia and France. All of them emerged as great powers from the Congress of Vienna in 1815.¹⁸ The relationship among the great powers resulted in relative success concerning balance of power dynamics. This mainly occurred because none of the great powers relied on a permanent or rigid system of alliances that would divide them.¹⁹ According to Paul Kennedy, "Among the five Great Powers, Britain was considered the only real industrialized nation in the world; that her dominance in commerce, transport, insurance and finance was great, and in most cases increasing; that she possessed the most extensive colonial empire ever seen, yet one which was to multiply in size during the century; and that despite occasional scares, her naval strength and potential was virtually unchangeable."²⁰ Many factors influenced Britain's dominance during this era, but Lord Palmerston's

¹⁷ Robert Stewart-Ingersoll and Derrick Frazier, *Regional Powers and Security Orders: A Theoretical Framework* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 4.

¹⁸ Walter L. Arnstein, *Britain Yesterday and Today: 1830 to the Present* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1983), 55.

¹⁹ Arnstein, *Britain Yesterday and Today*, 55.

²⁰ Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, 150.

foreign policy leadership set the stage for British regional patterns of behavior.

Britain's most influential character in shaping foreign policy during the Victorian era was Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston, also known as Lord Palmerston. He was an ex Tory who served as the Prime Minister of Britain on two occasions, but more importantly, as foreign secretary from 1830 to 1834, from 1835 to 1841, and again from 1846-1851.²¹ Lord Palmerston was involved in British foreign policy for the majority of the formative years of Pax Britannica. His brinksmanship in governmental politics assisted in making the continental peace a requirement for maintaining British dominance. The Concert of Europe was a balancing action, but at times Palmerston thought of it as two antagonistic camps—the liberal West (Britain and France) facing the reactionary East (Russia, Prussia, and Austria).²² Palmerston's policies of brinksmanship in this era typify the style required to make an offshore balancing strategy effective.

Britain relied on buck-passing and bystanding, unless her full weight was required to check potential hegemonic states. Mearsheimer defines buck-passing as getting another state to do the heavy lifting.²³ Moreover, it has to do with who does the balancing, not whether it is accomplished.²⁴ The idea of buck-passing is the preferred method for a balancer because it will likely maintain or increase its relative power position. The British used this political technique throughout the 19th century. As an insular nation, Britain could focus on buck-passing as a suitable course of action until a potential hegemon grew to a point that either a balancing coalition or direct action was required to maintain the status quo. One of the bedrocks of British strategy is to prevent the rise of a Eurasian hegemon in the region. This remains a core requirement of

²¹ Arnstein, *Britain Yesterday and Today*, 58.

²² Arnstein, *Britain Yesterday and Today*, 59.

²³ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 269.

²⁴ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 269.

a modern offshore balancer as well. Britain's ability to balance against the continental powers was at the forefront of their Splendid Isolation strategy. Many British still viewed France as a national enemy and wanted to ensure no other Napoleon took the throne; this ideology would soon apply to Russia as well. The balance of power framework of the era swayed British balancing initiatives. However, this balance remained strong only as long no one side (patterns of behavior, military, and economic) of the three-sided edifice weakened and collapsed the entire infrastructure.²⁵ The forty-year balance of power framework—this Concert of Europe—collapsed on the global stage as Russian expansion threatened the universal peace.

Global Patterns of Behavior

The first year of the Crimean War serves as an ideal time horizon to illustrate the effectiveness of the British offshore balancing strategy in the global environs. Furthermore, it focuses the case study to a specific timeframe, emphasizing the global patterns of behavior of an offshore balancer during Pax Britannica. There were many contingencies to examine during the nineteenth century. Analysis of the Crimean War is important because it is one of the first modern global industrialized struggles. In Orlando Figes' seminal work, *The Crimean War*, he states, "It was also the earliest example of a truly modern war—fought with new industrial technologies, modern rifles, steamships, and railways, novel forms of logistics and communication like the telegraph, important innovations in military medicine and war reporters and photographers directly on the scene."²⁶ Again, this example is not a perfect representation of Buzan and Wæver's modern definition of global patterns of behavior, but it is global in the sense that security actions took place across portions of the European RSC (Europe), Middle East RSC

²⁵ Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, 157.

²⁶ Orlando Figes, *The Crimean War: A History* (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2010), xix.

(Ottoman Empire) and Asian RSC (Russia), which had an effect on global polarity as a structure.

Britain's intervention in the Middle East was an attempt to protect its interests and balance the expanding threat posed by Russia. Buzan and Wæver's constructivist approach within RSCT elucidates British behavior underlying its security actions against Russia. The British as the securitizing actor claimed they were fighting to protect Turkey from Russian bullying, in fact, they were fighting to protect both their interest in free trade and religious interests, within the Ottoman Empire.²⁷ More importantly, they were fighting to balance against the Russian Empire, a rival they feared in the Asian region. Three British national interests were at stake: (1) the potential loss of wealth and gained from free trade, (2) maintaining the balance of power within the Concert of Europe, and (3) ensuring Russia did not dominate the region. The British simply constructed reasons to securitize the Ottoman Empire.

Since Britain was the securitizing actor, it was able to claim rights to use extraordinary means, or break the rules, for reasons of security.²⁸ According to RSCT, because Britain believed its national interests were a matter of its survival, (that is, the interests involve a point of no return that cannot be left to normal politics, and Britain's constructivist approach towards this security issue dictates it can break the rules. Interestingly, the dichotomy between the securitizing actor claiming a threat and the claim actually being a threat is critical to how the populace views the government's response to the Russian expansion. Specifically, Buzan and Wæver state, "The very act of labeling something a security issue—or a threat—transforms this issue and it is therefore in the political process of securitization that distinct security dynamics originate."²⁹ One of the key factors to understanding British intervention

²⁷ Figes, *The Crimean War*, xxii.

²⁸ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 71.

²⁹ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 71.

is although Britain was an insular nation, the Ottoman Empire fell within its informal empire, which meant the British political leadership had to make a security move in order for securitization to occur.

This makes securitization more difficult to understand from a causal standpoint because the actor determines what is and is not a threat, despite the conditions of the security environment. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde state, “Thus, the exact *definition* and *criteria* of securitization is constituted by the inter-subjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects.”³⁰ This might seem ambiguous because it suggests anything could constitute a threat, the key indicator differentiate between a securitizing move and securitization is the audience accepting the threat. Arnstein suggests the latent Russo phobia that had recently bubbled to the surface, along with the jingoistic reporting in British newspapers of the time, as well as Lord Palmerston’s insistence that the government take a stand all served as sufficient cause for the British populace to view Russia as a threat to their way of life.³¹

Britain is expressed as three referent objects: (1) Britain as a state refers to the territorial entity of Britain as defined by its borders, and its physical possessions both within its borders and external to them;³² (2) Britain as a nation relates to British national identity, first as a nation where authority emanated from the Crown and Parliament in Britain, then as one of the Great Power states within the Concert of Europe³³; (3) and finally Britain as a global empire that had the ability to maintain or shift the balance of power, affecting polarity within and outside of the European RSC. Further analysis of the Crimean War reveals how Britain used its splendid isolation strategy with respect to global patterns of behavior.

³⁰ Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*, 25.

³¹ Arnstein, *Britain Yesterday and Today*, 96.

³² Marshall, *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire*, 10.

³³ Marshall, *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire*, 11.

The Crimean War was fought between Russia on one side and the French, British, and the Ottoman Empire on the other. Each of the belligerents fought the war for many reasons but the Russian and British reasons are most important to this study. Since we have already established British motives for fighting the Crimean War, a look at the Russian motives is in order. According to Orlando Figes, “As the Tsar, Nicholas I, the man more than anyone responsible for the Crimean War, he was partly driven by inflated pride and arrogance, a result of having been tsar for twenty-seven years, partly by his sense of how a great power such as Russia should behave towards its weaker neighbors, and partly by a gross miscalculation about how the other powers would respond to his actions; but above all he believed that he was fighting a religious war, a crusade, to fulfill Russia’s mission to defend the Christians of the Ottoman Empire.”³⁴ Arguably, this was a war over religion, for our purposes, the idea that it was about the struggle of influence by the European powers in the Ottoman Empire is of extreme importance.

A critical point in the prelude to war was the negotiation process and attempted buck passing by the Great Powers to solve the emerging issues in the Ottoman Empire, also known as the Eastern Question. The four great powers—Britain, France, Austria, and Prussia—met in Vienna to design a compromise between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Wetzel posits, “No doubt the British line in the Near East continued to be dictated by strategic needs—the need to safeguard British preponderance over the Mediterranean routes; to preserve the Ottoman Empire as a barrier against Russian expansion; to keep Russian warships behind the Straits.”³⁵ The Vienna compromise was contentious among the Great Powers, but enforcement by the Great Powers was essential in order for it

³⁴ Figes, *The Crimean War*, xxii.

³⁵ David Wetzel, *The Crimean War: A Diplomatic History* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1985), 15.

to work. Britain, France and Austria all relied upon the international negotiation system established at the Congress of Vienna to solve major crises. However, their efforts resulted in failure as the sultan rejected the ambiguous language of the compromise.³⁶ As noted earlier, if buck-passing or bystanding fail, an offshore balancer must take direct action to protect its interests. Britain prepared for military action to quell the rising hegemon—Russia.

Lord Palmerston, no longer the foreign secretary, summarized Britain's foreign policy before the war stating, "We are connected, and have been for more than a century, with the general system of Europe, and any territorial increase of one Power, any aggrandizement which disturbs the general balance of power in Europe, although it might not immediately lead to war, could not be a matter of indifference to this country and would, no doubt, be the subject of conference, and might ultimately, if that balance were seriously threatened, lead to war."³⁷ The potential expansion or contraction of the Middle East RSC because of the Russian threat represents an external transformation of the Middle East RSC. This change in the RSC threatened the status quo that Britain relied upon for trade and economic gains. Furthermore, Britain's intervention prevented the rise of a potential Eurasian hegemon (Russia), a cornerstone concept of offshore balancing.³⁸

Russian aid had assisted with defeating the 1848 revolutions in Europe. The Russians assumed their assistance to Austria during the revolutions would prevent Austria from objecting to their annexation of Ottoman provinces. The stability that had long existed in Europe was now in jeopardy. Austria, a British ally, suffered from near collapse. According to David Wetzel, "The revolution in Hungary and Germany had been battered into defeat by the tsar; and the refugees who poured into

³⁶ Wetzel, *The Crimean War*, 86.

³⁷ Arnstein, *Britain Yesterday and Today*, 95.

³⁸ Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 105.

England after 1848 identified his success with abject tyranny, and alien conspiracy to destroy civilization.”³⁹ Two dangers that the British feared occurred as result of Austria’s near collapse and the shattering of the Metternich system: the ability for the French to advance across the Alps on one side and to cross the Rhine on the other.⁴⁰ The Russian expansion in the Middle East influenced these two factors making them a possibility if the Russian were successful. As Austria was no longer a British ally, this destroyed Britain’s ability to buck pass against France and Russia, a critical feature of offshore balancing. The Congress of Vienna had held for four decades and though there had been minor skirmishes and domestic revolutions, the Great Powers had shown considerable restraint—this did not last.⁴¹

Therefore, Britain deployed its navy in response to a situation in which a hostile power (Russia) sought hegemony over a critical region of the world (Ottoman Empire).⁴² However, the deployment of the British navy triggered the Russians to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia (modern-day Romania).⁴³ The Turks refused to accept the Russian insistence that they would to serve as the protector of Ottoman Christians. In doing so, the sultan announced that Turkey would go to war if the Russians refused to evacuate within two weeks.⁴⁴ The tsar’s refusal led to conflict between the Russia Empire and the alliance of the French, British, and Ottoman Empires as well.

By besieging Constantinople, Russia would not only gain the city, but also acquire access to the Mediterranean Sea. France, Britain, and Austria wanted to maintain the neutrality of the Dardanelles by preventing the expansion of Russian influence in this key area.⁴⁵ The

³⁹ Wetzel, *The Crimean War*, 18.

⁴⁰ Wetzel, *The Crimean War*, 19.

⁴¹ Arnstein, *Britain Yesterday and Today*, 95.

⁴² Colby, *Grand Strategy*, 27.

⁴³ Arnstein, *Britain Yesterday and Today*, 96.

⁴⁴ Arnstein, *Britain Yesterday and Today*, 96.

⁴⁵ Arnstein, *Britain Yesterday and Today*, 96.

Turks used the particulars of the situation to their advantage, knowing that regardless of how irresponsible they acted, France and Britain would feel obliged to back them up.⁴⁶ Eventually, diplomatic relations between Russia and the Turks failed. Consequently, the British sent part of the Royal Navy to the northern Aegean Sea as a peacekeeping force.⁴⁷ The use of overwhelming naval power as a deterrent is another critical component of an offshore balancing strategy. The fleet deployed to protect British trade and economic interest. The right to free trade in all parts of the Ottoman Empire was essential to British interests in the Near East, especially the unique trading privileges it extended towards Turkey.⁴⁸ Once an offshore balancer forgoes buck-passing and takes direct action against an aggressor, it must have the ability to project its power and this military power must equal or exceed the aggressor's capability. Buzan and Waever suggest, "Great powers possess global military reach. They have the ability to project force around the globe, and as a result, they can intervene in any regional security complex whenever it suits their interest."⁴⁹

The tipping point of the war came in late November of 1853, when the Russian Black Sea Fleet destroyed a Turkish flotilla at Sinope. Elbridge Colby portends, "An implicit task of an offshore balancer is to retain substantial military forces with forcible entry capabilities that can sustain operations away from bases stateside, in order to hold or wrest territory away from and adversary."⁵⁰ The sinking of the Turkish fleet at Sinope stimulated Britain's social construction of the Russian threat to their security interest in the Near East. Walter Arnstein illustrates this point using a quote from the London Chronicle, "We shall draw the sword, if draw we must, not only to preserve the independence of an ally,

⁴⁶ Arnstein, *Britain Yesterday and Today*, 96.

⁴⁷ Arnstein, *Britain Yesterday and Today*, 96.

⁴⁸ Wetzel, *The Crimean War*, 15.

⁴⁹ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 33.

⁵⁰ Colby, *Grand Strategy*, 6.

but to humble the ambition and thwart the machinations of a despot whole intolerable pretensions have made him the enemy of all civilized nations!”⁵¹ The sovereignty and ideology of the state can thus define the global patterns of behavior.

With British securitization principles firmly conceptualized in their patterns of behavior, Britain and France began waging a war with Russia. Arnstein states, “Their fleets entered the Black Sea, and both nations insisted that Russia confine its naval forces to the Crimean port of Sebastopol. The Russians refused, and war was declared in March 1854.”⁵² The examination of the first year of the Crimean War serves as a useful case for examining global patterns of behavior during Pax Britannica’s, “Splendid Isolation” era; it also serves to validate offshore balancing as a viable strategy today. Analysis shows how Britain intertwined its constructivist patterns of behavior with the materialist aspects of the military to balance the Russian threat of expansion into the Crimea.

British Military Capabilities

After the defeat of Napoleon, the British Empire had one of the strongest militaries in the world. The British relied heavily on the military to enforce its foreign policy and to increase the nation’s overall wealth. The nexus between the military and Britain’s socioeconomic progress was critical to the nation’s rise to world dominance. As an offshore balancer, the British mainly relied on economic initiatives instead of military force ashore to coerce other states. This flexibility in national security is the essence of offshore balancing. Britain maintained a small conventional army because the foreign policy of splendid isolation did not require a large standing army. Essentially, the British buck passed the requirement for troops by relying on the Indian Army abroad.

⁵¹ Arnstein, *Britain Yesterday and Today*, 96.

⁵² Arnstein, *Britain Yesterday and Today*, 96.

Carl Watts explains, “Traditionally Britain was not a great military power, but its control of the Indian Army provided a significant military reserve of around 180,000 troops, which accounted for more than sixty per cent of total manpower in British garrisons overseas in the 1880s. The Conservative Prime Minister Lord Salisbury once remarked that India was ‘an English barrack in the Oriental Seas from which we may draw any number of troops without paying for them.’ Indeed, the Indian Army served in more than a dozen imperial campaigns in Africa and Asia during the second half of the nineteenth century. The Indian Army was therefore a significant element of the Pax Britannica, for without it the cost of maintaining imperial control would have been much higher.”⁵³ The British case is unique because they employed another states’ army to provide their collective security—a concept that takes the offshore balancing strategy to another level. However, the possession of land involves considerable logistics, civil responsibility and military establishments all issues that detract from economic growth. This is the baseline for why a state would seek to avoid becoming decisively engaged in land wars and look to the offshore option as its primary strategy. The underpinnings of an effective offshore balancing strategy for Britain during this period was overwhelming naval power.

The Empire would not have existed without a substantial military apparatus, specifically the Royal Navy. Ronald Hyam quotes Admiral John Fisher in 1903: ‘The British Empire floats on the British Navy.’⁵⁴ A strong naval force ensures that an offshore balancer is capable of securitization and maximizing their share of world power. Naval supremacy gave the British the global reach required to maintain the empire. Paul Kennedy describes the century of Pax Britannica, stating “The result of this century of intermittent warfare was the greatest

⁵³ Carl Watts, “Pax Britannica,” accessed March 23, 2013, http://www.academia.edu/2013776/Pax_Britannica.

⁵⁴ Ronald Hyam, *Britain’s Imperial Century, 1815-1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion* (Lanham, MD: Barnes & Noble, 1993), 15.

triumph ever achieved by any state: the virtual monopoly among European powers overseas colonies, and the virtual monopoly of world-wide naval power.”⁵⁵ In essence, the British Empire was synonymous with sea power.

The Royal Navy focused on two main functions: to prevent the rise of enemy naval bases and the spread of their influence, and secondly, to protect British interests with respect to its citizenry and property abroad.⁵⁶ Command of the sea helped to improve communications within the empire. Therefore, Britain established a worldwide chain of strategic bases from which it could exert its influence.⁵⁷ Britain was able to conduct these functions because she possessed more ship tonnage than any other country in the world.




Figure 1. European Navies: tonnage above 500 tons

Source: Niall Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2003), 50.

In 1815, Britain had 214 ships of the line and 792 cruisers.⁵⁸ Naval supremacy ensured Britain could penetrate emerging markets and protect its security interests. The Royal Navy along with British political

⁵⁵ Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, 150.

⁵⁶ Hyam, *Britain's Imperial Century*, 17.

⁵⁷ Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, 154.

⁵⁸ Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, 156.

leadership decided to maintain a hundred ships of the line and 60 cruisers. From 1815 to 1835, naval intervention made up the preponderance of British military actions.

British naval mastery was so unique during this period because the navies of other Great Powers were in decline or did not present any real threat to the Royal Navy. France still had the second largest Navy, about fifty ships of the line, but she suffered defeat at the hands of the British during the Napoleonic Wars.⁵⁹ Ironically, British naval dominance existed because none of the other Great Powers could prevent British dominance. None of the Great Powers, either individually or collectively, tried to build or staff equivalent warships because of destruction of their naval fleets from previous engagements, the absence of monetary assets to support the fleet and the lack of will to engage in a naval arms race.⁶⁰ Any states that could balance or challenge Britain did not seek to acquire overseas bases because they could not produce the industrial strength to curb Britain's maritime predominance due to the internal problems listed above.

A heavy reliance on naval power allows a state a certain level of disengagement in that it does not rely on ground forces to maintain the balance of power within a given region. This lack of constant presence of troops ashore on foreign soil reduces potentially messy interactions between states and lowers the risk of conflict. However, an offshore balancing strategy does not ensure dominance forever. David Reynolds states, "The Pax Britannica was the product of a brief era in which Europe was unusually stable and sea power was the dominant military technology. The empire rested not on armed might but on a delicate balancing act of coercion and persuasion, all done on the cheap at a time when rival European empires had temporarily been eclipsed. When other nations industrialized, great powers re-emerged and empire became

⁵⁹ Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, 157.

⁶⁰ Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, 157.

harder to retain, in consequence position changed for the worst.”⁶¹ The Crimean War, combined with the eventual unification of Italy and Germany later in the century, destroyed the peace Britain had used to gain her dominance. Future offshore balancers must recognize this aloofness and its implications on either Japan or India as the balancer. Essentially, a state employing an offshore balancing strategy must remain cognizant of regional security dynamics. Sea power and adequate power projection were factors underlying Pax Britannica, but arguably, the most important material factor ensuring the peace of Britain was its economic capacity.

British Economic Capacity

The backbone of British dominance during the 19th century was its economic capacity. The British populace, the industrial revolution (commerce and banking), and trade were the three elements influencing British wealth. Each element was essential to Britain’s rise in its own distinctive way. Paul Kennedy notes, “Britain maintained this dominance, at a cost to the nation of £1 or less per annum per head of population in defence expenditure—equivalent to somewhere between 2 and 3 per cent of the national income. Rarely has such a position in the world been purchased so cheaply.”⁶² The economic comparison between splendid isolation and offshore balancing reflects a less expensive approach than other aggressive grand strategies. Christopher Layne points out a general comparison between Britain’s budget during Splendid Isolation and a modern offshore balancing strategy. Layne generalizes, “An offshore balancing strategy would require defence budgets in the range of 2-2.5 per cent of gross national product.”⁶³ While this budget is a generalization, it marks the similarities despite the gap between the respective centuries.

⁶¹ Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled*, 30-31.

⁶² Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, 150.

⁶³ Layne, *From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing*, 112.

British economic power provided revenue to increase military strength and it was an effective tool in coercing weaker states when required. It was able to coerce other states by holding economic goods at risk if the state did not comply with its economic influence attempts. A British economic embargo of Europe during the latter part of the Napoleonic Wars almost brought Europe to its knees.⁶⁴ Britain employed naval blockades in order to ensure it maintained its economic wealth from international commerce. Moreover, Britain could choose between economic warfare, sanctions or embargoes to coerce others, an economic technique not easily matched by the other great powers. In David Baldwin's seminal work, *Economic Statecraft*, he states, "Power relations infuse every aspect of social life: there is no reason to make an exception for international economic relations."⁶⁵ A deeper analysis of the British populace, the industrial revolution, and trade will stress the economic foundation underlying the British Empire.

The people of any nation are fundamental to its success. According to Walter Arnstein, "The population of England, Wales, and Scotland in 1831 was 16,161,183—more than twice what it had been seventy years earlier."⁶⁶ The burgeoning population that began to coalesce around towns and cities brought with it less of a focus on farming as people looked for factory jobs. The change from the feudal farming system to a more industrialized urban society was foundational to the industrial revolution that was underway.

British citizens began to emigrate as the cities became crowded and the jobs scarce. British colonist abroad played an important role in passing along British ideas, ideology and institutions after emigrating. P.J. Marshall notes, "British emigrants took their values with them and adhered tenaciously to them. When they tried to rule other peoples

⁶⁴ Lawrence James, *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire* (London: Abacus, 1995), 158.

⁶⁵ David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 61.

⁶⁶ Arnstein, *Britain Yesterday and Today*, 18.

British administrators in this period were not mindful of the need to adapt to indigenous ways of doing things, but the assumption that British ways were the norm was usually inescapable.”⁶⁷

How the British viewed themselves provides a window into the expansion of the empire. For example, Marshall posits, that British citizens believed that they only resorted to violence in self-defence. The record, however, shows continuous conquest and violence from 1783 through 1870.⁶⁸ This point is critical because the British government would have to make calculated decisions about the cost incurred in wars of conquest or interventions. Moreover, John Mearsheimer posits that population size and the wealth of a country matter. A simple equation illustrates the point: size of population + state’s wealth = sinews of military power.⁶⁹ Latent or potential power was enough at times to deter aggressors and maintain the peace of Britain. A key factor in this equation is the wealth of the state. Without an economic foundation, the ability to generate power of any type is difficult. While people are required to make economies effective, an apparatus must be in place to turn power into actual goods that a collective society needs to influence other states. The industrial revolution was such an apparatus.

The industrial revolution marked an era of unprecedented economic growth that coincided with the Peace of Britain. The year 1815 is a great starting point because it was the first time a modernizing industrial economy was able to operate in peacetime conditions.⁷⁰ For as Paul Kennedy states, “Through the industrial revolution, the island people has been transformed from *a nation of shopkeepers* into the *workshop of the world*.”⁷¹ By the middle of the nineteenth century, Britain produced about two-thirds of the world’s coal, about half of its

⁶⁷ Marshall, *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire*, 29.

⁶⁸ Marshall, *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire*, 30.

⁶⁹ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 61.

⁷⁰ Hyam, *Britain’s Imperial Century*, 21.

⁷¹ Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, 151.

iron, five-sevenths of its steel, two-fifths of its hardware, and about half of its commercial cotton cloth.⁷² The spread of goods across the world greatly increased British wealth.

As Britain industrialized, it brought many countries into the world economy. Interestingly, London was the primary financier of many of the new and emerging markets across the globe. Kennedy posits that returns on overseas investments of £10½ million in 1847 rose to £80 million by 1887. By 1875, Britain had over £1,000 million invested abroad with the interest re-invested in old and new areas.⁷³ Much of the increase in capital went directly into shipping; the increase in British ship tonnage also increased her advantage during early industrialization by 1890 —she had more registered tonnage than the rest of the world put together.⁷⁴ London was the principal financier of this great fleet as well as the central hub of international finance as well. According to Paul Kennedy, “The City had become the centre of international finance in all its aspects: loans, private and governmental, were floated there, currencies exchanged there, insurance arranged there, commodities brought and sold there, shipping chartered there; and every one of these services increased the centralizing tendency by the establishment of branch offices and agencies abroad.”⁷⁵ While the industrial revolution was only one aspect of British economic capacity—trade also increased British wealth.

Trade was an important facet of the British Empire. Britain relied on the trading internal to its colonies, such as importing produce and exporting manufactured goods, in order to increase its overall wealth. However, trade went beyond the empire. Britain sought to increase trade with the former colonies of Spain and Portugal in Latin America, the

⁷² Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2006), 151.

⁷³ Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, 151.

⁷⁴ Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, 151.

⁷⁵ Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, 151.

Ottoman Empire, the Middle East, and with China.⁷⁶ Paul Kennedy explains, “Cotton, the fastest growing industry of all, was a catalyst or multiplier in itself, demanding ever more machinery, steam-power, coal and labour. In 1793 cotton exports had totalled £1.65 million; by 1815 they had risen to £22.55 million, becoming Britain’s greatest export by far.”⁷⁷

Trade was the monetary technique that provided wealth to increase shipping, which in turn increased British military power, which allowed the empire to use its naval supremacy to expand across the globe without committing significant troops ashore to maintain order. The nexus between the military capability and economic capacity provided Britain with a powerful connection of material strength to deploy the necessary assets in order to enforce British foreign policy. With a deeper understanding of a historical representation of an offshore balancing strategy established, an examination of Japan’s patterns of behavior, military capability and economic capacity will reveal its potential role as a balancer in the Asian region.

⁷⁶ Marshall, *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire*, 25.

⁷⁷ Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, 140.

Chapter 3

Land of the Rising Sun: Adjusting the Asia Balance using Japan

The global situation surrounding Japan is continuing to change on a daily basis, even following the recent disaster (Great East Japan Earthquake). The global presence of emerging economies is increasing and in response to the new requirements of the times, brought about by multi-polarization it is vital that Japan's foreign policy respond robustly to these changes...In accordance with the new National Defense Program Guidelines that were formulated at the end of last year, Japan will enhance its readiness and mobility and work to build a dynamic defense force, thus responding to the new security environment.

Yoshihiko Noda, Former Prime Minister of Japan

Background

Japan is a country in transition. Japan's foreign policy has been distinct but it has also evolved since the end of the World War II. According to a 2102 report by Randall Schriver and Isabella Mroczkowski, "Japan since the turn of the century has led some experts to conclude that the 'Land of the Rising Sun' is on the decline. The debt is 200 percent of annual gross domestic product (GDP), Japan's population is aging at the fastest rates in the world while birth rate is decreasing steadily, and the nation's energy security faces an uncertain future.¹ While Japan may appear on the decline, Japan is in fact reemerging and reshaping the sources of its national power. The source of Japan's national strength and resilience is its people and culture."² Japan's present-day foreign policy developed from a long evolutionary process shortly after World War II. Japan's foreign policy now faces

¹ Randall Schriver and Isabella Mroczkowski, "Japan's Global Engagement: A Mapping Study of Japan's Global Role and Contributions" (Project 2049 Institute, April 2012), http://project2049.net/documents/japan_global_engagement_2012.pdf, 7.

² Schriver and Mroczkowski, *Japan's Global Engagement*, 7.

globalization and new emerging threats within the Northeast Asian RSC. According to RSCT Japan represents a referent object; as such, Japan will look to securitize according to its interests, regionally and internationally. Central to our understanding of Japanese security is the fact that Japan associates its security interests with its political institution and the national population.³ The political leadership of Japan strongly influences its security agenda and also the perception and acceptance of the population's support.

Andrew Oros and Yuki Tatsumi suggests a slightly different point of view stating, "In the next year or two, many aspects of Japan's security policies may change as a result of the new domestic political situation, combined with deepening demographic and economic challenges as well as tensions between at least two competing visions of Japan's security future that have been evident in the past decade."⁴ This is not the first time it has had to adapt to a changing regional and global environment.

Japan's historical narrative since the beginning of the 20th century has been dynamic. Japan's recognition as a great power followed its victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1905). In the middle of the 20th century, Japan's defeat in the World War II resulted in the loss of great power status, at least militarily. After World War II, Japan and the US signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, thereby, strengthening Japanese ties to the West and underpinning the development of Japan's postwar military capabilities and overall security posture.⁵ Despite Japan's loss of military prowess following the World War II, the underpinning of its unique status as a follow-on economic power emerged from its alliance with the US. The framework for

³ Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 10.

⁴ Andrew Oros and Yuki Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch--Japan* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 3.

⁵ Oros and Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch--Japan*, 71.

incremental changes in Japan's foreign policy and military posture developed during this era.

Japan's demilitarization required it to chart a new course in the world to ensure its security. A result of the mutual security treaty signed in 1951 with the US (renewed and modified in 1960) made Japan rely on the US security umbrella. Japan's pacifistic ideology underpinned Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru's doctrine as a way forward for the state—known as the Yoshida Doctrine.⁶ The Yoshida Doctrine, blended with Japan's postwar pacifistic constitution, established that Japan would no longer build "war potential" and it foreswore the use of violence or the threat of violence to solve international conflicts.⁷

Japan's experience after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki cast a long shadow on its foreign policy. Interestingly, Prime Minister Yoshida's 1957 edict summarizes Japan's focus on economic diplomacy; Yoshida states, "For our country which has adopted pacifism as its basic policy the only way to raise the living standards of 90 million people living on four small islands, and to develop our economy, is peaceful expansion of our economic power."⁸ The Yoshida Doctrine has underpinned Japanese foreign policy for more than 60 years but it has made Japan a unique and unusual great power, with its reliance on economic diplomacy and a small self-defense force. The unusual nature of Japan's great power status compared to typical great powers is the latter are not only wealthy, but they all have strong military capabilities as well. Japan would need to continue to make incremental changes in order to protect its interests in the contemporary environment.

⁶ Bert Edström, "The Yoshida Doctrine in Uncharted Waters," in *Japan's Foreign Policy in Transition: The Way Forward for Japan as an International Actor in a World in Flux* ed. Bert Edström (Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2011), 12.

⁷ Edström, *Japan's Foreign Policy in Transition*, 12.

⁸ James Llewelyn, *Japan's Evolving Notion of National Security* (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2010), 1.

Japan made incremental changes in foreign policy as the security environment shifted around it. According to a 1980 report, submitted by the Study Group on Comprehensive National Security, it recommended that Japan should increase military cooperation with the US, strengthen its own defense capabilities, persuade the Soviet Union that Japan was neither a weak state or a threat...and improve crisis management for large scale disasters.”⁹ Japan adopted this comprehensive security strategy and began to view the world from a slightly different perspective after the report. Economics would not be the sole tool of statecraft under the comprehensive security strategy. Japan began to think about blending its economy, political and military tools to protect its security.¹⁰ Despite this change in mindset, it did not quite manifest into plans of action at the regional and global levels concerning Japanese foreign policy. Japan still focused on the Yoshida principles of economic diplomacy and eschewed adopting the full panoply of the comprehensive security strategy. However, a new multipolar and globalized world may cause Japanese political decision-makers and its populace to transform its current foreign policy to protect its national interests.

Japan’s ability to transform and securitize against threats in the region requires a populace willing to accept the threats and vulnerabilities espoused by the government. Since the end of the Gulf War, the economic and military ascendancy of China and India has disrupted the foundation of Japan’s foreign and security policies. Securitization occurred when the Japanese people accepted these emerging country’s economies and militaries as existential threats to their economic prowess (referent object). Understanding this dynamic is critical for Japan because it may justify how Japan can operate on the fringes of its pacifistic constitution to secure its interests and normalize as a middle or great power state over time. Japan will try to securitize its

⁹ Llewelyn, *Japan’s Evolving Notion of National Security*, 19.

¹⁰ Llewelyn, *Japan’s Evolving Notion of National Security*, 19.

interests and create the balance of power required for stability in the region as long as it remains an economic great power.

If Japan is an economic great power, then it is an unbalanced one because traditional great powers have relied on decisive military strength as the basis for their great power status. Japan's behavior is wide-ranging because of its reliance on economic diplomacy within the region. In order for Japan to become a "normal nation," it must change its patterns of behavior within its RSC by regaining the right to use force in its foreign policy. A change in Japanese patterns of behavior starts with significant modifications to Article 9 of its constitution. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution renounces war. Japan's regional security environment since 1990 suggests a change is required for it to become a "normal nation", one that would regain the right to use force in its foreign policy.¹¹

Another requirement will be for Japan to not "free ride" on the coat tails of what Japan believes is the ultimate security guarantee—US military assistance. Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security contends an armed attack against either Japan or the US in territories under the administration of Japan is a danger to the peace and safety of both countries and they would address the common danger in accordance with Japan's constitutional provisions and processes.¹² While this Article has clear language, how Japan and the US determines what constitutes an armed attack that threatens both nation's interests is much more ambiguous. For Japan to regain the use of force as a normal nation and rely less on what it believes is a definite security guarantee, it will have to militarize without becoming either a loose cannon or overly aggressive nation, while attempting to overcome its historical war narrative. A newly constituted Japan with more freedom

¹¹ Llewelyn, *Japan's Evolving Notion of National Security*, 33.

¹² "Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA)," accessed February 5, 2013, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/index.html>.

to act as a normal nation and the dynamics of the Asian supercomplex will affect Japan and its neighbor's behavior in distinctive ways within the region. While the Asian supercomplex is not the focus, the security dynamics it creates for Japan in the Northeast RSC influences Japanese patterns of behavior. The Asian supercomplex is a set of RSCs (South Asian RSC, Northeast RSC, and the Southeast RSC) within which the presence of one or more great powers generates relatively high and consistent levels of interregional security dynamics.¹³

into the East Asia

Figure 3. Asian Supercomplex

Source: Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: A Guide to the Global Security Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 99.

¹³ Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: A Guide to the Global Security Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 492.

As mentioned above, Japan's regional patterns of behavior are critical to the incremental changes required for its foreign policy to change and are fundamental in assessing its ability to serve as an effective balancer within a precarious Northeast RSC and Asian supercomplex.

Regional Patterns of Behavior

The Northeast Asian region has served as a hotbed of intraregional security dynamics since the Gulf War. Japan's lack of military involvement in the Gulf War served as a watershed towards Japan's uncompromising commitment to solely utilizing economic statecraft in solving foreign policy problems. James Llewelyn states, "Just one month after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces on August 29, 1990, Tokyo pledged \$10 million toward refugee relief efforts in Jordan, while the next day it promised \$1 billion in financial support of the multinational forces in the Gulf. With Japan having some much at stake economically, being almost totally dependent on imported oil from the Gulf, simply resorting to "checkbook diplomacy" met with substantial international criticism."¹⁴ An examination of Japan's "checkbook diplomacy" is instructive and covered later in the chapter. Yet, not providing ground forces on the global stage elucidates Japan's course of action within the Northeast region as well.

Using Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver's description of the Northeast RSC, the regional actors of this RSC are China, North Korea, and Japan.¹⁵ Japan's great power status achieved in the early years of the twentieth century set the parameters for a fully independent Japan to engage a quasi-independent China, thereby forming the basis of a RSC in Northeast Asia.¹⁶ A deeper analysis of Sino-Japanese relationship illustrates the security dynamics of the Northeast RSC and the Asian Supercomplex.

¹⁴ Llewelyn, *Japan's Evolving Notion of National Security*, 28.

¹⁵ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 130.

¹⁶ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 130.

Japan and China

Japan's relationship with China is multifaceted. Both countries long history has had a significant influence on their relationship. They share a level of interdependence in their economies and culture. A unique dynamic exists between the overall size of the two nations and their respective economies. Oros and Tatsumi state, "China's population of approximately 1.34 billion is over ten times that of Japan, but its official economic size (in terms of GDP at official exchange rates) is slightly smaller than Japan's."¹⁷ Underlying Japan's complicated securitization of Chinese threats are two factors concerning Japanese security and identity. According to Anthony DiFilippo the two factors are Japan's culture, which continues to exude pacifist values and Japan's incremental approach and debate on the path to becoming a "normal country."¹⁸

Furthermore, complications arise from the American security umbrella that Japan relies on when dealing with a state such as China. Not only does China have to consider using its military forces beyond its borders when it comes to China, it has to think about nuclear weapons when dealing with an emergent nuclear great power such as China. Japan has not transformed its military or nuclear capability, but they remain hot topics among its political leadership going forward. An examination of the Japanese patterns of behavior regarding the Senkaku Islands is informative regarding Japan's balancing capabilities.

The dispute over the Senkaku Islands between Japan and China is just one of many foreign policy issues between the two countries.

¹⁷ Oros and Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch--Japan*, 106.

¹⁸ Anthony DiFilippo, *Japan's Nuclear Disarmament Policy and the U.S. Security Umbrella* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillian, 2006), 183.



Figure 4. Senkaku Islands

Source: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/index.html>

The Japanese government has stated, “Moreover, the Senkaku Islands were neither part of Taiwan nor part of the Pescadores Islands, which were ceded to Japan from the Qing Dynasty of China in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Shimonoseki, which came into effect in May of 1895. The fact that China expressed no objection to the status of the Islands being under the administration of the US under Article III of the San Francisco Peace Treaty clearly indicates that China did not consider the Senkaku Islands as part of Taiwan. The Republic of China (Taiwan) recognized the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, which came into effect in August 1952.”¹⁹ In this case, Japan (securitizing actor) has conducted securitization of the sovereignty of the islands (referent object) against Chinese claims of territoriality (threat). Japan has claimed that Senkaku Island was never disputed as being a part of Japan until an academic survey suggested natural resources were present around the islands.

Andrew Oros and Yuki Tatsumi state, “The rhetoric and action over territorial disputes over the offshore islands and maritime resources have ratcheted up notably in the past decade, fueled by nationalist activists on

¹⁹ “Senkaku Islands : Japan-China Relations: Current Situation of Senkaku Islands - Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” accessed February 3, 2013, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/index.html>.

both sides.”²⁰ The importance of the areas surrounding the islands concerns access to explore the undersea oil and gas resources. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, it was not until 1971, after an academic survey indicated the possibility of the existence of petroleum resources under the surrounding sea in 1968 that the Government of China and Taiwan authorities officially began to make their own assertions about territorial sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands.²¹ The strategic and economic value attached to the islands is cause for concern, as it could easily lead to conflict between the two countries.

The problem remains contentious because of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. If Japan conducts actions in defense of the islands, it may compel support from the US military. Recently, the Japanese purchased the remaining islands from a private citizen and transferred them to itself under domestic civil law.²² The Chinese have reacted by sending vessels into the territorial waters of Japan, which has resulted in protest in China by Japanese nationals. Tensions flared in late 2010 following the Japanese Coast Guard’s detention in September of a Chinese trawler captain near the disputed islands.²³ According to *Military Balance 2012*, the action resulted in China suspending political and diplomatic exchanges with Japan, halting bilateral talks on the joint exploitation of gas fields in the East China Sea, and strengthening its unofficial embargo on the export of rare earth minerals.²⁴ The protest resulted in violent acts against the Japanese protestors by the Chinese. The nature of the alliance between Japan and the US has profound influence on the balancing behavior in the region. Japan has conducted desecuritization, claiming it is committed to continue dealing with the

²⁰ Oros and Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch--Japan*, 107.

²¹ Senkaku Islands : *Japan-China Relations*.

²² Senkaku Islands : *Japan-China Relations*.

²³ *The Military Balance 2012* (London: Routledge, 2012), 220.

²⁴ *The Military Balance 2012*, 220.

current situation in a calm manner from a broad perspective. In fact, Japan plans to maintain close communications with China in an effort to ease tensions to prevent further escalation as of the writing of this paper.²⁵ North Korea presents an additional set of unique challenges for Japan and its relationships in the region.

Japan and North Korea

If Japan's security relationship with China is multifaceted, then its relationship with North Korea is limited. If Japan's foreign policy focus has been on economic diplomacy, then Japan views North Korea's foreign policy focus as one of military diplomacy. According to a 2011 Japanese white paper, North Korea has been advocating the construction of a "powerful and prosperous nation" as its basic policy, aiming to create a strong socialist state—by adopting "military-first politics" to realize this goal.²⁶ North Korea's definition of military-first politics is as a form of leadership that advances the great undertaking of socialism by resolving all problems that arise in the revolution and national construction on the principle of military first.²⁷ Furthermore, it stresses the importance of armed forces as the pillar of the revolution. Much of the contemporary tension stems from Japan's expansion that inflicted deep wounds on the Korea Peninsula (Asian Holocaust) before and during World War II. This situation remains tense since the Korean Peninsula has remained in a state of cease-fire since the Korean War (1950-1953). This historical episode, along with the current issues between Japan and Korea, has the potential to destabilize the region.

If the standoff between the two Koreas broke out into conflict at the demilitarized zone, it would likely force the US (due to the U.S. forces located in South Korea, and the U.S.-South Korea security pact) and possibly China (because of its traditional support to North Korea) to

²⁵ "Senkaku Islands : *Japan-China Relations*."

²⁶ Ministry of Defense, "Defense of Japan 2012," 58, accessed February 5, 2013, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2012.html.

²⁷ Ministry of Defense, "Defense of Japan 2012, 58."

participate.²⁸ Because of the geostrategic location of Japan, it has conducted successful securitization of North Korea based on the potential missile and nuclear threat and North Korea's antics within the region.

Japan would likely support the US and South Korea if this developed into conflict, which would cause serious internal diplomatic issues considering Japan's constitutional constraints. Andrew Oros and Yuki Tatsumi say Japanese support is likely because the disruption in trade, regional production and the impact to the financial markets would severely affect the Japanese economy, not to mention the potentially large number of refugees that may flee to Japan by ship or air.²⁹ Beyond the issue of the two Koreas being in an active standoff, the threat of nuclear conflict is also another factor influencing Japanese and North Korean security dynamics.

Japan is slowly adjusting its security policy to account for a potential nuclear conflict considering North Korea's continuing quest in the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons technology. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan recently commented on a launch of a so-called North Korean "satellite" stating, "Japan will, in coordination with other countries take appropriate measures so that the resolution will be implemented effectively. Japan strongly urges North Korea to heed the firm message of the international community seriously and comply faithfully and fully with the relevant Security Council resolutions, and not to conduct any further provocative acts including further launches and nuclear tests. Japan is resolved to continue to make active efforts, in close coordination with the international community, for the comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern regarding North Korea, including abductions, nuclear and missile issues."³⁰ The

²⁸ Oros and Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch--Japan*, 99.

²⁹ Oros and Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch--Japan*, 99.

³⁰ *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA)*.

North Koreans have continued this particular behavior concerning potential nuclear and missile tests.

Additionally, Nightwatch, a critically acclaimed nightly newsletter that tracks and assesses US national security, published an analytic product suggesting that North Korea may have conducted their third nuclear test. On February 12, 2008, the Nightwatch report stated, “The US Geological Survey reported seismic activity in North Korea that could represent a man-made detonation. The US Geological Survey said the 4.9 magnitude tremor occurred at a depth of 1km. It put the epicenter close to North Korea's nuclear test site. Chinese, Japanese and South Korean earthquake and meteorological agencies also detected the event. The Chinese Earthquake Administration described it as a suspected explosion. South Korean forces are on alert. Japan has convened its national security council.”³¹




Figure 2. Range of North Korean Ballistic Missiles

Source: Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2011*, 59, accessed February 5, 2013, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2012.html.

Japan has maintained serious concerns over North Korea's bellicose stance towards its neighbors.³² Japan will continue to reshape its foreign

³¹ “NightWatch - KGS,” accessed February 12, 2013, <http://www.kforcegov.com/Services/IS/NightWatch.aspx>.

³² Llewelyn, *Japan's Evolving Notion of National Security*, 36.

policy to deal with potential North Korean destabilizing initiatives. However, as Japan's foreign policy changes to adjust for balance of power dynamics within the region, its quest to become a normal country relies on its ability to interact and influence using effective global patterns of behavior.

Global Patterns of Behavior

The advent of a Post-Cold War era and disappearance of the Soviets as a major threat in the Northeast Region were catalysts for Japan to change its global patterns of behavior. Japan sought a new way forward by looking to increase its role on the international stage. According to James Llewelyn, Prime Minister Takeshita's 1988 International Cooperation Initiative was evidence of Japan being no longer content with passively following Washington's leadership.³³ Specifically, Llewelyn states, "The initiative was built on three relatively uncontroversial pillars, chiefly: to strengthen Japan's contribution to international peace, expand its Official Development Assistance (ODA), and promote cultural exchange."³⁴ These pillars illustrate the changing paradigm in Japanese foreign policy from the long standing Yoshida Doctrine. The economic capability section of this chapter will cover Japan's utilization of ODA. A closer examination of Japan's contributions towards international peace illustrates its global patterns of behavior and evolutionary foreign policy.

Peace Keeping Operations

Japan sought to change or restore its international image by actually getting involved with peacekeeping operations. In June 1992, Japan introduced into law the United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) law. This law would allow Japan for the first time to send Japanese Self Defense Force personnel abroad to participate in specified

³³ Llewelyn, *Japan's Evolving Notion of National Security*, 27.

³⁴ Llewelyn, *Japan's Evolving Notion of National Security*, 27.

operations.³⁵ The introduction and actual execution of this law is demonstrative of the evolutionary process surrounding Japanese foreign policy. Since 1992, Japan has sent more than 8,400 personnel (SDF and police forces) to support UN missions in Cambodia, Mozambique, Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Haiti and other locations.³⁶ In 1992, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia requested that Japan provide military and civilian personnel in secondary support roles, such as cease-fire observers, civilian policing and electoral monitoring.³⁷ This was monumental in that it marked the first time Self Defense Forces participated in an international security role.

It has been twenty years since the passing of the PKO law; since that time the Government of Japan has established a multi-ministerial group to evaluate Japan's role in UN PKOs.³⁸ The authors of the ministerial group write, "Japan must take the initiative in actively addressing global issues and regarding them as its own problems...Rather than being content with its current status, the country should consider expanding its cooperation while achieving a balance between specific peacekeeping needs and its own capacity."³⁹ Peace Keeping Operations remain a critical component towards Japan's transition to a "normal" country. While it is a slow process, it shows that Japan can change in response to the regional and global security dynamics. However, a true test of Japan's transition to normalization came during the Gulf War (1990-1991) when the international community expected it to commit troops on the ground.

Japan's Lessons from the Gulf War

The Gulf War (1990-1991) offers valuable lessons learned about how Japan conducted itself under its global foreign policy outlook at the

³⁵ Llewelyn, *Japan's Evolving Notion of National Security*, 33.

³⁶ *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA)*.

³⁷ *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA)*.

³⁸ Schriver and Mroczkowski, *Japan's Global Engagement*, 15.

³⁹ Schriver and Mroczkowski, *Japan's Global Engagement*, 15.

time of the crisis. After Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, the United Nations authorized military force, a decision that offered Japan an opportunity to offer ground assistance.⁴⁰ However, Japan was keen not to violate Article 9 of its Constitution; instead, Japan decided to offer economic assistance (details provided later in the chapter) vice putting boots on the ground. Since Japan had slowly begun to evolve its foreign policy, the international community was shocked Japan did not commit forces to the ground offensive. According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, the Gulf Crisis forced Japan to judge and cope with many questions that Japan had not experienced since 1945.⁴¹

This stemmed from the fact that Japan fully supported the UN-centered foreign policy, had strong ties to the US, and its own security interests in the region.⁴² Despite Japan's large financial contributions, the Gulf War marked a failure of Japan's checkbook diplomacy foreign policy and served as a lesson for Japanese policymakers to review the perception of Japan by the international community. Despite an evolving foreign policy, Japanese involvement in the Gulf War demonstrates its political and constitutional constraints on the use of force internationally. Clearly, Japan must continue to reassess its international policy, but analysis of its security relationship with the US reveals its inherent dependency on this security umbrella and its implications.

Japan and the US

A unique dynamic of the Northeast RSC is the interplay of the US in the region because of its security alliance with Japan. This means that the RSC does not respond to the influence of the US. Rather, the US must respond to the existing relationships between the regional actors. This forms the basis for the rest of the analysis of this region.

⁴⁰ Schriver and Mroczkowski, *Japan's Global Engagement*, 11.

⁴¹ *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA)*.

⁴² Schriver and Mroczkowski, *Japan's Global Engagement*, 11.

Buzan and Wæver call this infusion of the US in the region—overlay. Overlay as defined by Buzan and Wæver occurs when the interests of external great powers transcend mere penetration, and come to dominate a region so heavily that the local dynamics of security interdependence virtually cease to operate. It usually results in the long-term stationing of great power armed forces in the region, and in the alignment of the local states according to the patterns of great power rivalry.⁴³ Clearly, the US has influenced the security dynamics within the region and Japan's foreign policy in particular.

The security relationship between Japan and the US has played a significant role in shaping Japan's foreign policy in the past and may play a significant role in shaping its policy in the future. Oros and Tatsumi state, "In fact, so substantial is the role of the US that much analysis of Japan's security policy—its development, its strategy, its future direction—begins by examining the role that the Japan-US alliance played in shaping Japanese security policy, and the contributions of the US in particular."⁴⁴ The ties between Japan and the US are interdependent in the contemporary international environment. This serves Japan quite well considering Article 9 of its Constitution. Moreover, it has allowed a certain level of free riding for Japan because it is not required to spend as much on its own military defense. A telling statistic is the Japanese have not had one member of the military killed in combat in over 65 years, a point of pride and a point of envy, depending on where one sits on the issue.⁴⁵ This success is mainly due to Japan's alliance with the US. Japan's future as a "normal" country lies in transitioning the Japanese-US relationship from protector to partner.

⁴³ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 490.

⁴⁴ Oros and Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch--Japan*, 71.

⁴⁵ Oros and Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch--Japan*, 72.

As Japan transitions, it must come to grips with the relationship it will have with the US within a dynamic and changing international security environment. Within this new multipolar world some of the political leadership within the Japanese government question whether the security umbrella promised by US will indeed be there in a time of crisis or war. As James Llewelyn writes, “Nevertheless, the primacy of Japan’s bilateral relationship with the US remained in both security and economic terms, while the mutual security treaty remained the cornerstone of Japan’s security thinking.”⁴⁶ So how does Japan achieve more autonomy from America in the international environment? One concept of an autonomous Japan is that it continues to “normalize” under US guidance and oversight. The table below highlights this trend.

Table 1. Major Japan-US Security Agreements, 1996-2010

Year	Event
1996	Hashimoto-Clinton Joint Security Declaration
1996	New Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA) proclaimed
1997	Security Consultative Committee releases revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation
2001	Japans offers to send MSDF ships to Indian Ocean to assist the US-led coalition forces fighting in Afghanistan (as well as other support post 9/11)
2003	Japan offers to send JSDF troops to Iraq to assist with reconstruction and relief efforts
2005	Japan agrees to co-development of missile defense with the US
2005	SCC reports released (February and October) on “common strategic objectives” and on realignment of the alliance
2006	SCC reports releases an implantation plan for the realignment of US forces in Japan
2007	SCC report on “alliance transformation” issued
2009	Agreement signed on the transfer of the Third Marine Expeditionary Force from Okinawa to Guam, based on the 2006 report
2010	SCC joint declaration commemorates the 50 th anniversary of the Security Treaty

Source: Adapted from Andrew Oros, *Global Security Watch--Japan*, Global Security Watch (Santa Barbara, Calif: Praeger, 2010), 81.

⁴⁶ Llewelyn, *Japan’s Evolving Notion of National Security*, 12.

Since 1996, an incremental change in Japan's security outlook through its agreements with the US shows a trend towards Japan considering more normalcy based on the threats and vulnerabilities it faces in the region. Even though the US occupation force played a vital role in drafting Japan's postwar constitution where Article 9 was the dominant feature of its foreign policy going forward; the US often pressured Japan to rebuild its military forces as the security situation in East Asia deteriorated.⁴⁷ Ironically, this has been difficult because of lack of public support to change the premise of Article 9 and Japan's military history in the region.

While the US and other countries have often demanded a Japan that is more participatory in the maintenance of international security, the US recognizes that a re-militarized Japan could thwart or undermine its objectives in the region. Llewelyn states, "At the same time, another important historical antecedent to understanding the current US role in Japan's security policies was the simultaneous US desire to contain Japan—to prevent Japan from the development of sufficient military capacity to once again challenge the US militarily, or to thwart security objectives in the region. The pursuit of a considerable US base presence in Japan served this, among other, purposes; a US effort to ensure that Japan would not become a nuclear weapons state in the 1960s, including efforts to secure Japanese ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is another."⁴⁸ However, a restructured military and nuclear capable Japan is necessary to truly normalize and wield influence in a dynamic region with rising or dormant hegemons.

Likewise, America can avoid the regional squabbles or messy conflicts if Japan is more capable of securing its interests militarily, rather than getting involved because of significant overlay, as the situation exists now. There is no doubt that both Japan and the US rely

⁴⁷ Oros and Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch--Japan*, 74.

⁴⁸ Oros and Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch--Japan*, 74.

on one another for stability in the region. Whether Japan believes a loss of the US security umbrella will lead to instability or whether the security umbrella is actually required as a lynchpin of stability; continuing to redefine Japan's evolving global patterns of behavior as a partnership rather than protectorate is a positive way forward towards a "normal" country that can secure its interests via independent military action.

As long as a cooperative partnership remains in place, the US is capable of assisting Japan with its transition to normalization. This is beneficial to Japan in that it allows it to continue transitioning towards normalization with great power assistance and it benefits the US because they have oversight of the transition and the US can use its alliance with a newly normalized Japan to buck pass or burden share more effectively. Christopher Layne sums up the security dynamic stating, "As potential great powers (Japan) come to doubt the reliability of the US security umbrella (which will occur even if the US sticks with a strategy of preponderance), they inevitably will seek strategic self-sufficiency (including nuclear weapons). It is unlikely however, that an offshore balancing strategy would touch off a proliferation chain reaction. Middle and small powers, given their limited resources, might well decide that they would be more secure by enhancing their conventional forces than by acquiring nuclear weapons."⁴⁹ Thus, there exists a possibility to exploit a normalized Japan for US competitive advantage in the region.

Additionally, an offshore balancing strategy does not advocate letting a normalized Japan go it alone; the US would assist when Japan's inherent ability to check a rising hegemon is inadequate. In January 2012, President Obama issued *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense*, announcing out of necessity a

⁴⁹ Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," *International Security* 22, no. 1 (July 1997): 115.

rebalance toward the Asia Pacific region.⁵⁰ The rebalance offers significant opportunities for Japan to normalize and the US to employ an offshore balancing strategy in a multipolar world that uses Japan as the buck-catcher or burden sharer.⁵¹ Acknowledging that Japan's foreign policy and engagement with the international security environment will continue to evolve under close guidance of the US, an analysis of Japan's global patterns of behavior if it possessed nuclear weapons is now necessary.

Japan as a Nuclear State?

Although this section is speculative regarding Japan as a nuclear state, it is necessary in light of today's complex security environment. Japan currently does not have any nuclear weapons capability. Japan still abides by its so-called Three Non-Nuclear Principles, established in December of 1967: (1) no possession of nuclear weapons, (2) no production of nuclear weapons, and (3) no introduction of nuclear weapons.⁵² Furthermore, Japan is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Politicians and scholars suggest that a nuclear Japan only exacerbates the "so-called" security dilemma in East Asia and while that may be the case, balance of power theory suggests an alternative outcome.

It is likely that a nuclear Japan would trigger other nations in the region to seek nuclear weapons as well, but history has shown balance of power dynamics underpin state behavior. Even if nuclear weapons proliferated in the East Asia region, the likelihood that states will bandwagon or buck-pass in order to prevent any one state from dominating the others is likely to occur. Currently, a non-nuclear Japan has not prevented either China or North Korea from modernizing and

⁵⁰ Barack Obama, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, January 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf (accessed 12 November 2012), 2.

⁵¹ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 270.

⁵² Oros and Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch--Japan*, 9.

increasing their military capabilities or seeking a nuclear capability, in the case of North Korea. Regardless, as a middle power in the region, Japan will have to address the nuclear issue as current and future existential threats increase in nature.

Several reasons underpin an examination of a potential nuclear Japan. First, if Japan is going to be a “normal” country that remains a middle power or future great power in the Northeast Asian RSC then a Japan with nuclear weapons is realistic and arguably critical for it to demonstrate the necessary influence as a small insular nation. Robert Gilpin suggests that prestige is about economic and military power, but nuclear prestige is a significant influencer to deter or compel other states in order to achieve its objectives.⁵³ Second, it means that Japan has modified or changed its pacifistic constitution and its population is willing to overcome the institutional pain and narrative of its previous experience with nuclear weapons, to allow the development or procurement of nuclear weapons for its arsenal. Japan is different from other nations because Japan has actually experienced the horrors associated with atomic weapons.⁵⁴

Interestingly, this is a lot to overcome, but it does not mean that it is impossible. Anthony DiFilippo states, “In 1969, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Foreign Relations Policy Planning Committee produced a secret report entitled *Our Nation’s Foreign Policy Principles*. This report, which did not become public until 1994, stated that, ‘The policy for the time being is not to have nuclear weapons, but economic and technical potential to make nuclear weapons will always be maintained and care will be taken not to accept restriction on this.’”⁵⁵ If the US security umbrella is removed or reduced significantly, Japan would face a

⁵³ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge; NY: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 31.

⁵⁴ Anthony DiFilippo, *Japan’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy and the U.S. Security Umbrella* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillian, 2006), 39.

⁵⁵ DiFilippo, *Japan’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy and the U.S. Security Umbrella*, 46.

situation in a dangerous neighborhood where its potential existential threats all possess or are in the process of developing nuclear arsenals of various sizes. Finally, Japan is one of the most advanced technological societies in the world, which produced a third of its electricity from nuclear generators prior to the nuclear disaster.⁵⁶ This suggests that Japan has the potential or at least components of the human capital needed to “go nuclear”. Oversight and assistance from the US could be beneficial to both states while transitioning to an offshore balancing strategy.

Simply put, Japan has made a choice not to develop or possess nuclear weapons. The most recent study completed in 1995 (but not made public until 2003) posits three reasons why Tokyo should not acquire nuclear weapons: (1) it would critically damage the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty; (2) it would undercut Japanese dependability on the US nuclear shield, while weakening the US-Japan security alliance; and (3) it would send a strong signal to other East Asian countries that Japan had embarked on a security path independent of the US.⁵⁷ The current international security environment may force Japan to take this least traveled path to ensure its interests in the future. A normalized Japan without a significant security umbrella provided by the US within the Northeast Asian RSC must have a nuclear weapons capability. Yet, nuclear weapons are only one piece of a normalized Japan; an analysis of its Self Defense Forces will show how its military capability influences its role as a balancer, with or without a nuclear arsenal.

Japanese Military Capability

In fiscal year 2005, Japan adopted the new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and a Mid Term Defense Plan (MTDP). A long tradition of NDPGs outlined Japan’s basic national security policies since the first one in 1976. However, it has been a decade since Japan

⁵⁶ DiFilippo, *Japan’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy and the U.S. Security Umbrella*, 44.

⁵⁷ DiFilippo, *Japan’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy and the U.S. Security Umbrella*, 44.

had passed and presented an alternative perspective on its defense doctrine. Beyond strengthening new initiatives, the new NDPG and MTDP made a comprehensive reassessment of the strategic picture by identifying international peace support operations as well as counterterrorism as primary components of Japan's national defense strategy to complement the legacy force concept of the Cold War and early post-Cold War years.⁵⁸ Furthermore, one of the most significant aspects of this version of the NDPG is that it explicitly identified China and North Korea as security concerns.⁵⁹ Traditionally Japan and its populace have shied away from even discussing the role of its defense forces, now it is not uncommon to see uniformed members of SDF featured in mass media, portrayed in movies, walking the streets of Japan, and working abroad in specific defense roles or participating in international relief.⁶⁰

Another significant factor concerning the Japanese people's perception is the military response to the 2012 great Tohoku earthquake, subsequent tsunami and Fukushima nuclear disaster. *Military Balance 2012* states, "The JSDF mobilized around 100,000 personnel (or 180,000 if support personnel are included) for disaster relief efforts. This represented nearly half of the forces' total strength and was the largest mobilization in JSDF history."⁶¹ This is one of the foremost antecedents of the newly drafted NDPG 2012 and suggests Japan may look to use its military more assertively and in creative ways when compared to its legacy strategy.

Prior to examining the specifics of Japan's military capability, a brief examination of the 2010 NDPG will reveal the framework for Japan's current disposition and military outlook. The 2010 NDPG

⁵⁸ Ingolf Kiesow and John Rydqvist, *Japan as a "power": Discarding a Legacy* (Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2008), 27.

⁵⁹ Kiesow and Rydqvist, *Japan as a "power"*, 27.

⁶⁰ Oros and Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch--Japan*, 4.

⁶¹ *The Military Balance 2012*, 220.

focused on the development of dynamic defense forces. The change from “basic to dynamic” meant Japan reserves the right to upgrade (and no longer—if deemed necessary—to limit its defense expenditures to one percent of its GDP) and increase its military and defense capabilities if the security environment should call for such changes.⁶² It cannot be stressed how much of a significant change the upgrade option marks Japan’s acknowledgement that their security environment is precarious at best. International Military Markets, a leading provider of intelligence, states, “Although Japan has traditionally restricted its defense budget to less than 1 percent of its Gross National Product (currently 0.8 percent of GNP), the sheer size of its economy has provided its armed forces with an annual military budget averaging more than \$40 billion.⁶³ This is the world’s third largest, which allows Japan to continue its role as a major arms buyer. Despite its lackluster economic performance over the last decade and a half, Japan has resisted making deep cuts to its defense spending.”⁶⁴ Axel Berkofsky illustrates Japan’s perspective, stating: “The recent qualitative, and to a limited extent quantitative, upgrade of Japan’s military and defense capabilities seems to indicate that the Tokyo is preparing itself to deal with an attack on its national territory.”⁶⁵

Removing the distinction between peacetime deterrence and other contingencies reinforces Japan’s commitment to restructure an antiquated post-Cold War defense force. Three items form the basis of the national security of Japan: (1) the prevention and elimination of potential threats to Japan and the minimization of the damages thereof; (2) the further stabilization of the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region and the prevention of the occurrence of threats through the

⁶² Axel Berkofsky, *Japanese Security and Defense Policies: Trends, Threat Perceptions and Prospects* (Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2011), 5.

⁶³ “Foreign Military Markets: Asia & Pacific Rim,” in *Japan* (Newtown, CT: Forecast International/DMS, 2012).

⁶⁴ Foreign Military Markets: *Japan*.

⁶⁵ Berkofsky, *Japanese Security and Defense Policies*, 10.

improvement of the global security environment; and (3) contribution to world peace and stability and establishing security for people.⁶⁶

According to Defense of Japan 2011, a Japanese white paper, it is important to utilize Japan's defense capabilities and build them up as dynamic and active resources. This ensures the capabilities are able to carry out various roles rather than relying on the conventional Basic Defense Force Concept that emphasizes deterrence through the "existence of defense forces".⁶⁷ Moreover, the white paper states, "For that purpose, Japan will develop 'Dynamic Defense Forces' supported by advanced technology and intelligence capacities and characterized by readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility, in consideration of the trends in military technology standards."⁶⁸ This newly envisioned SDF has a tremendous role to play in Japan's role as a regional and global balancer. As Japan deals with issues like the dispute over the Senkaku Islands with China and the maritime disputes with North Korea the changes to its military structure is essential.

The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) is a critical component in developing the ability to conduct maintenance of maritime order in the region. The principle aims of the MSDF are defense of the seas surrounding Japan, ensuring the security of the sea-lanes, and international peace cooperation activities through regularly conducting such operations as Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and anti-submarine operations.⁶⁹ The four major units that compose the MSDF are the Destroyer units, Submarine units, Patrol aircraft units and the Minesweeping units.

The layout of the MSDF has surface units organized into four Escort Flotillas with a mix of seven to eight warships each with bases at

⁶⁶ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2012*, 149.

⁶⁷ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2012*, 149.

⁶⁸ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2012*, 149.

⁶⁹ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2012*, 163.

Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru, and Ominato.⁷⁰ The Submarine units are organized into two flotillas with bases at Kure and Yokosuka; the remaining units belong to five regional districts. There are approximately 45,518 active duty personnel and an additional 1,100 reserve personnel, making it one of the smallest of services of the JSDF.⁷¹ Japan has continued to develop and increase the capabilities of its MSDF because it is critical due to Japan's dangerous insular geostrategic location.

As an island middle power with a heavy emphasis on economic trade, its maritime force should remain a focus as it seeks to maintain open sea lines of communication and works toward normalizing. Berkofsky posits that Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) has in recent years reduced its number of traditional destroyers, replacing them with at least six destroyers equipped with the Aegis sea-mobile Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, which enables Japan's navy (at least in theory) to intercept incoming North Korean and Chinese ballistic missiles.⁷² Berkofsky also states, "The Japanese Ministry of Defense estimates that hundreds of North Korean missiles are aimed at Japan (and South Korea for that matter). North Korea's short-range Nodong missiles are able to reach downtown Tokyo in less than ten minutes.

Although Japan's current missile interceptor systems—either land-based or deployed on Aegis destroyers—have improved significantly in recent years through regular tests, including joint tests with the US, both analysts and the Japanese government fear that Japan's existing systems would not yet necessarily be able to intercept and destroy one or more incoming North Korean missiles.⁷³ BMD is an essential element for dealing with a worrisome North Korea and ascending China that have renewed their focus on increasing and modernizing their naval power.

⁷⁰ *The Military Balance 2012*, 252.

⁷¹ *The Military Balance 2012*, 251.

⁷² Berkofsky, *Japanese Security and Defense Policies*, 10.

⁷³ Berkofsky, *Japanese Security and Defense Policies*, 13.

Despite the overall number of ships and personnel, in early 2011, the MSDF deployed to the South China Sea to conduct joint exercises with the US and Australia off the coast of Brunei.⁷⁴ The MSDF should continue to conduct these types of exercises because they underpin possible actions against an emergent China that threatens critical sea-lanes. A critical element of an offshore balancing strategy is a heavy reliance on naval power, as a potential balancer, Japan must be capable of checking China's actions at sea. Christopher Layne states, "An offshore balancing strategy would stress sea-based ballistic missile defense (crucial in the event the US has to wage a coalitional warfare in the early twenty-first century) and sea-based precision, standoff weapons systems (enabling the US to bring its military power to bear without committing ground forces to combat)."⁷⁵ Additionally, the US would assist Japan if required in projecting power in an anticipated anti-access/area denial (A2AD) environment. According to Axel Berkofsky the increase of Chinese submarine fleets and the deeper concern with the Chinese plans to build and deploy aircraft carriers, which are viewed as part of a Chinese so-called "anti-access strategy," are both designed to make it more difficult for the US to project military power in the Pacific.⁷⁶ Japan can seize on the opportunity to reassert itself in the maintenance of maritime order.

The Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) is another critical component of Japan's defense policy. There are several primary focuses of the ASDF consisting of conducting continuous ISR over the seas and airspace surrounding Japan, general air defense, and air defense of key areas using a full range of capabilities. Like the MSDF, the ASDF is one of the most advanced air forces in the world. The ASDF has approximately 47,123 active duty personnel and 800 reserve personnel. The ASDF

⁷⁴ Schriver and Mroczkowski, *Japan's Global Engagement*, 22.

⁷⁵ Layne, *From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing*, 113.

⁷⁶ Berkofsky, *Japanese Security and Defense Policies*, 11.

consists of a mix of combat, transport, advanced early warning, trainer fixed-wing aircraft, and search and rescue helicopters.⁷⁷

Furthermore, the ASDF has heavily invested in Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), purchasing the Standard Missile (SM) -3s and upgraded radar systems of ASDF surveillance aircraft, as well as command and control systems, in order to ensure they can seamlessly integrate with those operated by the MSDF.⁷⁸ Oros and Tatsumi contend, “As the missile threat posed by North Korea began to rise, BMDs began to be considered as an important part of air defense missions.”⁷⁹ Because of the integration of the air and ground aspects of island defense, the ASDF is in charge of the operation of Japan’s ballistic missile defense system. Beyond homeland defense, the ASDF continues to expand and test its capabilities. According to Oros and Tatsumi the ASDF has participated in disaster relief operations abroad, and it has also participated in UN peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia (1992-1993), Mozambique (1993-1995), Rwanda (1994), East Timor 1999-2000, 2002), and Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003-2009).⁸⁰

Another significant upgrade to the ASDF is the procurement of the conventional variant of the F-35 fighter aircraft. According to a Lockheed company representative, Japan signed a formal agreement with the US to buy an initial four F-35 fighters built by Lockheed Martin and other equipment for 60 billion yen (\$756.53 million).⁸¹ According to a December 2011 white paper, the Ministry of Defense selected F-35A as the new fighter and decided to procure a total of 42 aircraft. On December 20, 2011, the Security Council of Japan decided that, “42 F-35A aircraft shall be procured from FY2012 as the new fighter, in order

⁷⁷ Oros and Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch--Japan*, 48.

⁷⁸ Oros and Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch--Japan*, 48.

⁷⁹ Oros and Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch--Japan*, 49.

⁸⁰ Oros and Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch--Japan*, 49.

⁸¹ “US, Japan Sign Deal on First Four F-35 Fighters,” *Reuters*, June 29, 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/29/us-lockheed-fighter-japan-idUSBRE85S0VE20120629>.

to supplement deficiencies resulting from aging of the currently used fighters of the Air Self-Defense Force and facilitate their modernization.⁸²

As more of Japan's neighbors modernize their arsenals, Japan will need an aircraft that can cope with the modern technologies of potential threats and continue to provide adequate air defense in this type of technologically advanced environment. The procurement of a next generation fighter will fulfill the requirements of excellent stealth capability and situational awareness (SA) capabilities; and the development of network-centric-warfare, in which fighter aircraft, the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), aerial refueling tankers, and surface-to-air missiles (SAM), etc. form part of an integrated system.⁸³ The F-35 represents the type of comparative military-technological advantage and strategic flexibility that a balancer seeks to maximize within an offshore balancing strategy.⁸⁴ The maritime and air components are the most important services within an offshore balancing strategy, but the ground component or land armies remain the measure of great power status.

Troops that operate on land are essential to a nation's overall power, and the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) meet that need. However, because a balancer would rely heavily on naval and air power to check potential hegemonies in order to avoid the issues associated with conflicts ashore, only a brief analysis of the GSDF is required. An understanding of what the GSDF can accomplish is important in case sustained operations are required. Furthermore, as Japan becomes a "normal" country it will place more emphasis on the ability of its GSDF to secure its national interests.

⁸² Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2012*, 151.

⁸³ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2012*, 154.

⁸⁴ Layne, *From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing*, 113.

The GSDF is the largest service within the JSDF. It has 151,641 active duty personnel with 46,000 personnel in its reserve system.⁸⁵ The original mission of the GSDF was to deter attack, repulse small invasion, or provide a holding action until reinforced by the US.⁸⁶ As the security environment evolved and the government adapted its NDPG to reflect the security environment, the GSDF's missions changed as well. The new missions for the GSDF are homeland defense (both from conventional and unconventional threats), domestic disaster/ humanitarian relief, and international activities (including UN peacekeeping operations, international disaster/humanitarian relief efforts and participation in other types of activities conducted by multinational forces).⁸⁷ If conventional warfare were to take place, the GSDF is the first line of national defense. The major components of the GSDF are maneuver units (armored, mechanized, airborne, air assault and light forces), combat support, and combat service support. The national defense strategy of Japan will depend on its military to protect its national interests, but another noteworthy tool of statecraft is economics.

Japanese Economic Capacity

Japan's economy has been dynamic since the end of World War II. During the 1950s and 1960s, Japan averaged an annual growth rate of 8%, enabling it to become the first country to move from "less developed" to "developed" status in the postwar era.⁸⁸ Since it was a great power prior to World War II, Japan has the institutional knowledge to use its current economic situation to assist with its transition to a "normal" country. Japan is a stable democracy with the world's third largest economy giving it the foundational economic prestige of a great power despite its current military structure and pacifist constitution. Moreover, the majority of Japan's near continuous growth in the postwar period

⁸⁵ *The Military Balance 2012*, 252.

⁸⁶ Oros and Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch--Japan*, 51.

⁸⁷ Oros and Tatsumi, *Global Security Watch--Japan*, 51.

⁸⁸ "Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA)."

and continuity in governance it owes arguably to its greatest ally—the US.⁸⁹

According to the Japan Fact Sheet, the reasons for Japan's success in the postwar era include high rates of both personal savings and private sector facilities investment, a labor force with a strong work ethic, an ample supply of cheap oil, innovative technology, and effective government intervention in private-sector industries.⁹⁰ William Grimes states, "The Japanese economy has increasingly become oriented toward East Asia, with much of the country's manufacturing tied up in regional production networks. Reflecting this reality, Tokyo has sought to take a leadership position in regional initiatives, including ones that exclude its security patron, the US."⁹¹ However, Japan has had to overcome some economic issues and it faces current issues to maintain its economic strength.

Japan is currently facing some major economic challenges since its rise after World War II and nearly three decades of economic growth. Some of the challenges were recovering from the collapse of the "bubble economy" from 1986 to 1991, multiple recessions of the late 1990s to the early 2000s, the most recent global financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the economic impact of the earthquake and tsunami on 11 March 2011.

Another significant challenge for Japan is its declining and aging population. A declining or aging population will directly affect the country's economic and strategic strength because an aging population puts a tremendous burden on the working population to take care of the aging one.⁹² Furthermore, because of Japan's low fertility rates the ability to sustain its Self-Defense Force and a labor force are in jeopardy. According to the CIA Fact Book the population of Japan is 127,368,088

⁸⁹ *IHS Jane's Sentinel*, China and Northeast Asia (Couldson, Surrey: IHS Global, 2012), 271.

⁹⁰ "Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA)."

⁹¹ Ashley J Tellis, Mercy Kuo, and Andrew Marble, *Economic Meltdown and Geopolitical Stability* (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009), 105.

⁹² *IHS Jane's Sentinel*, China and Northeast Asia, 272.

(July 2012 est.) and is demographically composed of Japanese 98.5%, with other ethnic groups making up the rest.⁹³

Japan remains a predominantly homogeneous society, yet one way it can overcome its demographic issues is to encourage immigration or increase its fertility rate. Japan's fertility rate has experienced a continual decline, and it expects to shrink from 127 million to below 90 million by 2055.⁹⁴ Despite these challenges, Japan as the third largest economic power and with its prior history of conceptualizing security along economic lines, has maintained a continuous focus on using its economic prowess as the chief tool of statecraft.

The importance of the economy to Japan in terms of not only power and prestige but also its influence on Japanese foreign policy has forced the government to solve the economic challenges it has faced and faces now. Continued economic reforms are necessary to ensure that Japan is capable of playing the role of an effective balancer. Because Japan was once the economic pride of Asia and still possesses a substantial economy, despite its financial instability from the recession and the economic impact from the earthquake, it can regain its former status and turn that wealth into military power.

As John Mearsheimer asserts, wealth underpins power and wealth by itself is a good indicator of latent power.⁹⁵ One can assume that if Japan desired to build a normal military force as it appears they are slowly transitioning towards it possesses the economic capacity to do so. The number of US military bases in Japan and Okinawa provide a stable security umbrella for Japan. This security umbrella could be a limiting factor of Japan's desire to spend the money to build a powerful military. Japan is able to enjoy the "free rider" status concerning the collective

⁹³ "CIA - The World Factbook," accessed February 21, 2013, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html>.

⁹⁴ *IHS Jane's Sentinel*, China and Northeast Asia, 272.

⁹⁵ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 67.

security provided by the US, therefore, it can focus its monetary expenditures on other national interests.

Mearsheimer states, “The US preferred to keep Japan at bay, even though Japan was about as wealthy as the Soviet Union by the mid-1980s, if not sooner. Indeed, the available evidence indicates that Japan had a larger GNP than the Soviet Union’s by 1987...so although all great powers are wealthy states, not all wealthy states are great powers.⁹⁶ This is a potential reason that Japan focused on “checkbook diplomacy” as a major tool of statecraft.

Japanese political leadership has tended to view security in domestic terms and this has been a prime factor in shaping its foreign policy. James Llewelyn states, “At the elite level there was recognition that the US had effectively taken control of Japan’s external security, while their responsibilities tended towards maintaining internal domestic security...security was closely associated with domestic stability and economic prosperity...conceptualizing security along economic lines soon manifested itself in Japan’s economic diplomacy.”⁹⁷

As long as the US security umbrella remains in place, Japan will continue to make economic diplomacy the mainstay of its foreign policy. In January 2011, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Seiji Maehara, gave a foreign policy speech to the 177th Session of the Diet in which he promoted his four pillars of economic diplomacy. These include a free trade system, securing long-term and stable supply of resources, energy and food, international promotion of infrastructure systems as well as promotion of Japan as a tourism-oriented nation.⁹⁸ Japan has used its economic great power status in the form of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to create stability in the region and the international arena.

⁹⁶ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 79.

⁹⁷ Llewelyn, *Japan’s Evolving Notion of National Security*, xxi.

⁹⁸ “Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA).”

Japan responded to its criticized lack of putting “skin in the game” when it comes to crisis by using ODA as a specific tool of statecraft. Japan’s aid program has roots all the way back to the 1950s. Japan assisted Burma, the Philippines and Indonesia with monetary aid for damages in World War II. James Llewelyn provides another example of Japanese ODA stating, “Following the 1973 oil shock Japanese quickly sent a \$3 billion aid package to the Middle East, with Iraq and Iran each receiving \$1 billion each, while overall financial aid to the region jumped from 1.4% in 1973 to 24.5% by 1977.”⁹⁹ This mainly happened as Japan sought to ensure it could capitalize on the oil resources in this region, since it lacked a heavy oil repository itself. Instead of sending minesweeper ships, a military action counter to its pacifist outlook, Japan sent economic aid to assist in the Gulf War.¹⁰⁰

Japan’s economic aid during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan represent recent ODA actions. Japan’s focus is on ODA because it is the primary tool used to build bonds, partnerships and alliances. Japan views ODA as an important part of its security policy.¹⁰¹ Ironically, it led the world in this respect in the early 2000s, but has since dropped in overall rank as it has tried to recover from recession, the global financial crisis and the earthquake in 2011. Because of its overall rank then and now, Japan remains among other great powers who wield economic influence, both in their RSCs and globally.

Moreover, Japan has been more capable of responding forthrightly and coherently to economic crises rather than military ones, coupled with its reliance on America’s security umbrella. Japan has restricted itself to “spending strategies” such as ODA.¹⁰² This requires Japan to always look to ensure stability and peace are paramount in the region. The majority of Japan’s ODA has gone to Asia, because securitization of

⁹⁹ Llewelyn, *Japan’s Evolving Notion of National Security*, 20.

¹⁰⁰ Llewelyn, *Japan’s Evolving Notion of National Security*, 22.

¹⁰¹ Llewelyn, *Japan’s Evolving Notion of National Security*, 20.

¹⁰² Llewelyn, *Japan’s Evolving Notion of National Security*, 30.

economic aid is a core parameter for regional stability and acceptance by the Japanese populace. According to Bert Edström, Japan's ODA program has always heavily emphasized economic infrastructure: roads, railways, harbors, airports, power plants and other infrastructure necessary for economic development.¹⁰³ Alliance partners will continue to require Japan to do more than just throw money at problems. Economic tools are quite effective in a stable environment, but less so in times of war and conflict.¹⁰⁴ Economic primacy remains Japan's greatest asset in balance of power dynamics, but it will need to do more regarding economic reforms and combine its economic wealth with a "normal military infrastructure free of its pacifist mandate in order to recognize its full potential as a great power. An analysis of India's patterns of behavior, military capability and economic capacity will offer a comparison with Japan to show which country might serve as an effective and efficient balancer.

¹⁰³ Edström, *Japan's Foreign Policy in Transition*, 47.

¹⁰⁴ Llewelyn, *Japan's Evolving Notion of National Security*, 30.

Chapter 4

A Nuclear Republic: Maintaining the Asia Balance using India

India is the world's largest democracy, and one of its fastest-growing economies. The country is celebrated for its educated professional class, its urban-based prosperity, and its Bollywood-fueled cultural influence abroad. While parts of the country bask in the glow of newfound affluence, others continue to toil in the gloom of abject poverty. This other side of India is also riven by violence and unrest, which increasingly targets the government. Meanwhile, even as India takes on the trappings of a global power, it remains deeply concerned about security developments beyond its borders. Lurking beneath India's recent triumphs are internal and external security challenges that may well intensify in the years ahead.

Michael Kugelman

Background

India seeks to remain autonomous from the US; however, it also faces hard choices synonymous to America's, in terms of its security and protecting its national interests against a rising China. India is the largest democracy in the world with a population of 1.21 billion and it is South Asia's most powerful state.¹ India also has one of the fastest growing economies in the world. According to Michael Kugelman, a 2010 joint study by the U.S. National Intelligence Council and the European Union declared it the world's third-most powerful nation.² Conversely, the internal issues India faces will have a profound influence on how India decides to resolve its external security dilemmas. Therefore, this chapter, unlike the preceding chapter, has a greater focus on India's domestic issues to show how these issues influence India's foreign policy,

¹ *IHS Jane's Sentinel*, South Asia (Couldson, Surrey: IHS Global, 2012), 185.

² Michael Kugelman, "Looking In, Looking Out: Surveying India's Internal and External Security Challenges" in *India's Contemporary Security Challenges* ed. Michael Kugelman (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), 5.

military capabilities, and economic capacity. Dr. Amit Gupta summarizes Indian foreign policy as one that must neutralize Pakistan, gain respect from China, have closer ties with the US yet not appear to be a puppet, and continue the military relationship with Russia.³

In light of this prescient and broad foreign policy summary, India will need to fix or reform many of its domestic issues in order to neutralize. Despite India's internal and external issues, some scholars consider India an emerging great power. Regardless, in order to understand India's potential as a balancer it is necessary to examine its domestic issues as a basis for its power and influence capabilities and foreign policy objectives.

After India gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1947 and became a republic in 1950, the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty has influenced its domestic politics and its outlook from the 1950s to the 1980s. Rohan Mukherjee and David M. Malone state, "India's journey from 1947 to the present day, in terms of both foreign policy and domestic politics, can be seen as a transition from idealism under Nehru, through a period of 'hard realism' (or *realpolitik*) lasting roughly from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s (coinciding with the dominance of the Indian political scene by Indira Gandhi), to economically driven pragmatism today."⁴

The first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, worked to fix domestic issues and he chose the path of non-alignment in the face of the bipolar order of the Cold War, arguing that India would have to 'plough a lonely furrow'.⁵ Nehru believed that India had the right to be a prominent actor in international affairs and though a poor country it must think of itself as a great one.⁶ These concepts still underpin India's foreign policy

³ Amit Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012), ix.

⁴ Rohan Mukherjee and David M Malone, "India's Contemporary Security Challenges," *International Affairs* 87, no. 1 (2011): 87.

⁵ Mukherjee and Malone, *India's Contemporary Security Challenges*, 87.

⁶ Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, 3.

under Manmohan Singh, its current prime minister. Furthermore, Nehru pushed for global disarmament and the reduction of tensions between the great powers. Despite this liberal outlook towards international foreign policy, Nehru remained pragmatic and a hard-core realist concerning Indian regional patterns of behavior. Another interesting note is the prime minister was the chief decision-making body of the government. Very little information flowed to the public making accountability and transparency of government decisions difficult to assess. This lack of accountability and transparency are still concerns in contemporary Indian governmental politics.

The lack of governmental transparency and near family dominance caused corruption and serious issues within India's governmental politics. India's actions during this era are indicative of Allison and Zelikow's, Model I (Rational Actor Model) which explains that rational decisions are made by a unified state that are value-maximizing—an excellent explanatory theory for the Indian leaders at the time.⁷ Between Nehru's death and Indira Gandhi's ascension to that of top diplomat, India continued to suffer from major economic and social tensions. These issues continue to plague the Indian political system. Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi came into power in 1966. Her tenure would only increase an already fractious governmental system. According to Gupta, Mrs. Gandhi's tenure as prime minister marked certain triumphs but also by put India into an economic stagnation as socialistic practices weakened the economy and encouraged corruption.⁸

Governmental corruption remains a serious problem for India. It was difficult for India to implement reforms considering the dominance of one family along with the cultural and institutional processes that further divided the nation. Corruption is a leading cause for the

⁷ Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision : Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York, NY: Longman, 1999), 18.

⁸ Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, 5.

suffering endured by India's populace as local, regional, and national government officials harass and coerce them over basic essential of everyday living to include access to collective goods. Amit Gupta posits that issues like the media unearthing of the 2G phone scandal, where \$31 billion was lost in government revenues, catches the public's attention as well as outside corporations that would look to invest in India.⁹ These types of scandals deprive India of needed revenue and outside business relationships, not to mention the impact on the Indian populace.

In 2011, a highly publicized hunger strike led by Anna Hazare forced the government to agree to an anti-corruption supervisory body.¹⁰ However, the planned bill followed the path of most reforms in the Indian government—it was blocked. These issues are a small representation of the type of corruption that happens on a daily basis in India at the expense of its people. Additionally, the demographic chasm of its leading politicians, who are sexagenarians and septuagenarians, while the majority of the country comprises young people exacerbates the issues and furthers the divide on how to solve India's problems.¹¹ India's young generation has a globalized outlook, while the old are cautious in the exercise of military power and limited in their worldview.¹² Corruption is not the only internal issues India faces, as its large population poses some of the most significant problems for it to overcome.

India's diverse and burgeoning population affects its ability to achieve great power status and its ability to effectively balance against China. While a large population can provide latent power through the building of a large standing army, it is also detrimental when the population is poor, uneducated, and the government lack the critical infrastructure and finances to change this dynamic. To put India's

⁹ Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, 16.

¹⁰ *IHS Jane's Sentinel*, South Asia, 187.

¹¹ Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, ix.

¹² Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, ix.

population problems into perspective, in 1968 S. Chandrasekhar states, “With only 2.4 percent of the world's total land area, India has to support 14 percent of the world's total population. Ironically, a baby is born every second and a half; 21 million births a year. Some 8 million persons die every year. Thus India adds 13 million people—Australia's present population—to its existing population every year.”¹³

This historical example of India's population growth provides a roadmap that leads India toward instability and chaos if it cannot develop measures to deal with this population growth. According to Jane's Sentinel, the current population growth rate was approximately 1.4 per cent between 2005 and 2010, and the country's population expects to grow to more than 1.6 billion by 2050.¹⁴ These astronomical numbers will adversely affect individual health and medical care, which limits India's capability to sustain a populace of productive citizens, a capable military, and a stable economy.

India's wealthiest citizens privately obtain most of its health care. The government expenditures on health services averaged around 1.2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), one of the lowest proportions in the world.¹⁵ Without government assistance, most Indians cannot afford the basic health and medical care they need. Many citizens attempt to gain access to health care putting more and more Indians into debt adding to its internal problems. The majority of the population lives below the poverty line. This has caused many of India's children under the age of five to suffer from malnutrition. The mortality rate for children less than five years old is 66 for every 1,000 births, and half of those deaths are a result of malnutrition, a reasonable estimate of this issue is

¹³ S. Chandrasekhar, “How India Is Tackling Her Population Problem,” *Foreign Affairs*, October 1, 1968, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/24029/s-chandrasekhar/how-india-is-tackling-her-population-problem>.

¹⁴ *IHS Jane's Sentinel*, South Asia, 215.

¹⁵ *IHS Jane's Sentinel*, South Asia, 215.

an average of 2,400 child deaths every day in India.¹⁶ These disturbing figures will continue to influence negatively India's ability to harness and project its national power. Furthermore, the lack of access and monetary means for proper disposal of human intensifies the problem by the high mortality rates, amassing more health problems and enlarging other environmental issues.

The environmental issues are another critical internal issue that India will need to overcome in order to have influence outside its borders. Because India has such a large population that subsists on 2.4 per cent of the world's landmass, India's natural resources are under enormous strain. India faces a plethora of environmental challenges that include deforestation, desertification, soil erosion, overgrazing, air pollution, water pollution, poor sanitation and shortages along with its growing population.¹⁷ While each of these issues has an impact, water pollution and the poor sanitation associated with it has a significant effect on its burgeoning population and their health.

Fresh water is a natural resource that India will depend upon with such a large populace. Michael Klare states, "Although the planet is brimming with salt water—which covers about 70 per cent of the earth's surface—the global supply of fresh water is relatively limited. Less than three per cent of the world's total water supply is fresh water...as a result, less than one per cent of the world's freshwater supply—or about 0.01 per cent of all water on earth—is accessible to the human population.¹⁸ Accordingly, nearly three fourths of India's population lives in water stressed areas within the country.¹⁹ Access to water encompasses more than personal consumption, it is also essential for

¹⁶ *IHS Jane's Sentinel*, South Asia, 215.

¹⁷ *IHS Jane's Sentinel*, South Asia, 207.

¹⁸ Michael T. Klare, *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict* (New York, NY: Owl Books, 2001), 143.

¹⁹ Infrastructure Development Finance Company, *India Infrastructure Report 2011 : Water Policy and Performance for Sustainable Development* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012), xxiv.

irrigating crops—a major source of Indian livelihood. India utilizes water in various ways; a 2010 statistic has agriculture as the largest consumer, accounting for almost 85 per cent of the total water consumption, followed by industry and energy (9 per cent), and domestic users (6 per cent).²⁰ Water is a fungible resource that exists in relatively finite amounts making it an ideal security issue.

If limited amounts of usable water are available and accessible, then India with its explosive population will seek to securitize this precious resource in the future. According to a 2011 Indian Infrastructure Report, water will increasingly dominate national and international politics and power; therefore, as more of India's population thirst for water, it may become critical for ensuring political, social, and economic stability.²¹ Many nations are defining resource security as a primary objective. Because India shares a border with Pakistan and China, the likelihood of water competition may lead to potential conflict. The Indus River basin has been a contentious area over water access and rights between India and Pakistan and is a potential flashpoint in the region.

As described above, water issues are not an issue that will stay confined to the borders of India. The possibility of water issues spilling over into India's patterns of behavior and possibly redefining military missions to deal with this issue will affect India's economic capacity in unforeseen ways. Water concerns are likely to be detrimental for India rather than advantageous. Despite all of the internal challenges India faces, analysis of its regional patterns of behavior will highlight the influence of its domestic issues on its foreign policy relationships with its neighbors.

India's Regional Patterns of Behavior

²⁰ Infrastructure Development Finance Company, *India Infrastructure Report 2011*, xxiv.

²¹ Infrastructure Development Finance Company, *India Infrastructure Report 2011*, Foreward.

The South Asian RSC is an ideal model for regional security dynamics. It consists of a variety of nation's that vary in their global standing. China is a great power that has tremendous external influence and continues to ascend as a potential hegemon into the South Asian RSC. Pakistan is a nuclear state that has an extensive history of tensions and conflict with India. India has aspirations to transition from a regional power to one of the great powers. Buzan and Wæver explains, "South Asia retained its status as an independent RSC, but still remained tied into the China-centered Asian supercomplex. India further inched its way towards great power standing by creating a complex centered on itself, but has not yet succeeded in breaking the bipolar pattern with Pakistan in South Asia."²²

If India can overcome its domestic challenges, it has the ability to acquire and drive the security dynamics in the region and abroad. However, India's regional challenges are complicated by its neighbors global standings, Mukherjee and Malone state, Six of India's neighbors rank in the top 25 dysfunctional states in the world, as tabulated by the Failed States Index of the Fund for Peace.²³ Ironically, India's thinks of its regional dynamics as "contested dominance" because it seeks to dominate the region through an increase in its economic prowess but Pakistan and China contest its ability and capability to do so.²⁴ A brief summary of the South Asian RSC will set the stage for a more in depth analysis of the regional and global patterns of behavior to follow.

The South Asian RSC prior to the Cold War began as a standard complex. First, its structure was standard because it was bipolar one rooted in mutual securitizations between India and Pakistan.²⁵ Weak states make up the rest of the RSC such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri

²² Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: A Guide to the Global Security Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 97.

²³ Mukherjee and Malone, *India's Contemporary Security Challenges*, 93.

²⁴ Mukherjee and Malone, *India's Contemporary Security Challenges*, 94.

²⁵ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 104.

Lanka, and Bhutan. Clearly, India has been able to dominate the region, but Pakistan has continued to check India since its independence, especially with the advent of their nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, the ethnic and religious differences that have crossed opposing national borders is fuelling strong interplay between domestic and regional security dynamics within the South Asian RSC.²⁶ While the domestic and regional security dynamics underpinned the RSC during the Cold War, it appears internal transformation may alter this continuum over time towards a slightly different RSC—one that has India as the dominant power breaking up the traditional bipolarity with Pakistan.

Since the end of the Cold War, it has been difficult to see a drastic transformation within the South Asian RSC. However, Buzan and Wæver summarize the case for internal transformation stating, “The case for transformation can almost be interpreted as a kind of continuity, same as those sketched during the Cold War: (1) internal transformation caused by the decay of the regional bipolar power structure; and (2) external transformation caused by the intensification of India’s rivalry with China.”²⁷

The current situation between Pakistan and India does not suggest that Pakistan will conduct desecuritization of India’s foreign policies and its military activities. A shift has occurred despite the nuclear parity. A few statistics bear this fact out: (1) India’s population is seven times and its land area is four times that of Pakistan; (2) India’s GNP is more than six times that of Pakistan, though, its GNP per capita is still only two-thirds that of Pakistan; and (3) India’s military expenditure is well over three times Pakistan’s, and its military manpower is twice as great.²⁸ In light of these one-sided statistics in India’s favor has failed to translate into geostrategic advantage against Pakistan. Externally, China is the

²⁶ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: A Guide to the Global Security Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 104.

²⁷ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 116.

²⁸ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 116.

new benchmark for India's reach to great power status. India has made continuous attempts to proclaim to the world that it now has a greater responsibility and obligation in light of its increased power. Yet, India remains focused on Pakistan and, neither China nor the rest of the world has acknowledged India's claim.²⁹ India's rhetoric does not quite match reality, but a deeper analysis of its relationship with Pakistan highlights the underpinnings of this security dynamic.

India and Pakistan

India and Pakistan have a history of caustic relations. Since India's independence continuous conflict has plagued both countries. There have been five Indo-Pakistani wars that have shaped the relationship and continue to be sources of tension: (1) the first war was over the status of Kashmir in 1948, (2) a second dispute over the Kashmir region, (3) a continuation of the conflict over Rann of Kutch (Kashmir region) in 1965, (4) a war in 1971 to 1972 over the division of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh, and finally (5) Pakistani forces and Kashmiri militants jointly invaded Indian-administered territory at Kargil in 1999.³⁰ This enduring conflict has evolved as both sides have nuclearized, ideological linked terrorism stresses both governments and stability, and both target the others military forces.

The regional conflict and territorial disputes are significant for India because its great power aspirations are moot if it cannot stabilize its own region. Amit Gupta's analysis of the situation suggests the intensification of the regional security dynamics stems from competing models of nationalism, sectarian tensions, divergent political and economic paths, and the quest for riparian resources.³¹ It is in the best interests of both India and Pakistan to resolve their differences for

²⁹ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 116.

³⁰ Ingolf Kiesow and Nicklas Norling, *The Rise of India: Problems and Opportunities* (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2007), 24.

³¹ Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, 37.

stability of the region, but this remains an elusive concept as long as the enmity underlies their relationship.

Differing religious and cultural ideologies form the basis and one of the causal links of conflict between India and Pakistan. These divergent views resulted in Hindus and Muslims realizing it was impossible for the two entities to survive within one sovereign place—the two nation theory.³² Pakistan looked to be a moderate Muslim state, while India sought to be a secular and democratic state. Pakistan tried to develop a democracy initially, but the process of implanting true democratic elections failed, resulting in a series of military leaderships and a civil war.³³ The 1971 Indo-Pakistani war culminated in East Pakistan succeeding as the new country of Bangladesh, leaving India as the predominant power in the region and Pakistan securitizing against India.

The modern engagement between India and Pakistan has continued to evolve since the 1971 war. Mukherjee and Malone contend that Pakistan's nuclear tests of 1998, following those of India in the same year established at least notional nuclear parity, promoted strategic stability of sorts in their volatile relationship."³⁴ However, it is naïve to think tensions cease to exist in the modern era. Once Pakistan gained a nuclear capability, they used this newfound asset as a way to promote unrest in the Kashmir region. Likewise, India began to develop a large conventional force that would threaten Pakistan, but it fell just short of provoking Pakistan to use its nuclear weapons.³⁵ Furthermore, Pakistan fuelled extremism as another political tool to protect its sovereignty. Amit Gupta contends there are several issues that continue to shape the amity and enmity in both India and Pakistan's patterns of behavior; these include the nuclear relationship, terrorism, Kashmir, Pakistan's

³² Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, 37.

³³ Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, 38.

³⁴ Mukherjee and Malone, *India's Contemporary Security Challenges*, 96.

³⁵ Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, 42.

fear of an emergent India, the water issue, and the continuing role of India in Afghanistan.³⁶

To create stability with Pakistan but also within the region, India must solve its water problems to sustain its populace and stabilize the region. Securitization of water, specifically the Indus River Basin is the norm because the security and sovereignty of both countries relies on this natural resource. In 1948, the Indian state of Punjab stopped the water flow to Pakistan in a show of sovereignty.³⁷ Earlier in the chapter, water pollution discussed as problematic issue, but access to water is of bigger concern because of the securitization implications. While access to water remains a source of vitriolic actions by both countries, it can also bring them to the negotiation table altering the long-standing caustic patterns of behavior. Gupta states, “What is unfortunate about the entire water dispute is that cooperation between the two countries, as envisaged in the second part of the Indus Water Treaty, is necessary for harnessing the water resources of the Indus to the fullest benefit of both countries.³⁸ India will continue to use water as a weapon against Pakistan as long as they continue to have long-term crisis issues. Pakistan remains the biggest threat to India’s security because the smaller weak states in the region do not have the capability or capacity to challenge India in the same way. However, another regional issue affecting India’s regional patterns of behavior is security and freedom of action on the Indian Ocean.

India and the Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean is of significant strategic concern to India. It is the third largest body of water, and it serves Asia’s largest economies as a vital lane of communication. According to *The Diplomat*, a current affairs magazine, the sea-lanes in the Indian Ocean are considered

³⁶ Amit Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012), 43.

³⁷ Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, 48.

³⁸ Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, 49.

among the most strategically important in the world.³⁹ According to DeSilva-Ranasinghe, *The Journal of the Indian Ocean Region* states, “More than 80 percent of the world’s seaborne trade in oil transits through Indian Ocean choke points.”⁴⁰ The area is vital line of communication for India’s trade relations, but the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) also possesses vast natural resources, two-thirds of the world’s proven reserves of crude oil, and a third of the natural gas.⁴¹

Moreover, India wants to position itself as the dominant Indian Ocean power, through security relationships with key littoral states such as Singapore, Mauritius, and Oman.⁴² These are all reasons for India to conduct securitization of the IOR. Yet, India has shown some reluctance to exercise actions that transition securitizing moves into securitization. In June 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta gave a speech announcing India’s importance to the US Indian Ocean Strategy. He focused on the new 21st century strategy, the rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region, and made it clear that defense cooperation with India is a linchpin in this strategy.⁴³

Amit Gupta confirms their reluctance explaining that India is not ready to be anybody’s linchpin in the near future for two factors: and adverse reaction to expeditionary actions; and a real belief in creating multilateral task forces to create order in the region.⁴⁴ This appears as a two-faced strategy that ostracizes the US but seeks relationships with other states in the region. This is not necessarily correct, nor is it incorrect either, it is the basis of India’s pragmatic approach and its self-

³⁹ Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe, “Why the Indian Ocean Matters,” *The Diplomat*, March 2, 2011, <http://the-diplomat.com/2011/03/02/why-the-indian-ocean-matters/>.

⁴⁰ DeSilva-Ranasinghe, *Why the Indian Ocean Matters*.

⁴¹ Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, *India’s Maritime Security* (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2000), 30.

⁴² Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe, *India’s Strategic Objectives in the Indian Ocean Region* (West Perth, Australia: Future Directions International, October 20, 2011), 2.

⁴³ Amit Gupta, “Indian Perceptions of the Indian Ocean,” *The Strategist*, September 2012, <http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/indian-perceptions-of-the-indian-ocean/>

⁴⁴ Gupta, *Indian Perceptions*.

reliant ideology, again viewed from an Allison and Graham's Model I, (Rational Actor Model) it all makes sense.

Recently, the External Affairs Minister Salman Khursid announced the geostrategic importance of the IOR and touted the 20-nation Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation as a regional body that will enhance individual and collective capacities to deal with the contemporary challenges of their maritime domain.⁴⁵ Interestingly, Buzan and Wæver put it this way, "The prospect of economic growth and rising military capability may put India in a position where both China and the US have to take it seriously. India could be an ally or an opponent of both. If China and the US begin to compete for India's favor, then it will be well on its way to achieving great power status."⁴⁶ The Indian Ocean is an arena where both China and the US may court India's favor. This is important for a US offshore balancing strategy considering the maritime importance described in the first chapter and illustrated by the Pax Britannica case study. The security dynamics of the IOR will also extend beyond the region and affect India's global patterns of behavior.

India's Global Patterns of Behavior

India faces a number of complex external challenges that will affect its global patterns of behavior. According to Nick Norling, India has strived to maintain strategic autonomy in its foreign policy while seeking to preserve a large role for itself in international affairs.⁴⁷ The issue is whether India can overcome the above-mentioned domestic problems while a great power balances against its every move—China. Therefore, India's biggest challenge has been whether it has the political will and

⁴⁵ "India Emphasizes on Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean Region," *The Hindu*, November 2, 2012, sec. National News, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-empahsises-on-maritime-security-in-indian-ocean-region/article4057934.ece>.

⁴⁶ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 120.

⁴⁷ Kiesow and Norling, *The Rise of India*, 27.

capability to be a major stakeholder in the international system.⁴⁸ So far, the record has been poor and India's quest for great power status has reflected the lower status of an emergent middle power.

India is attempting to demonstrate its emerging international focus by attempting to engage and interact on behalf of weaker states within its region. Recently, Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, exemplified this concept when he addressed the Indian Combined Commander's Conference stating, "We cannot hope to develop and grow peacefully while our immediate neighbors struggle with poverty, strife and underdevelopment. Our external policies will therefore emphasize friendly and cooperative ties with our neighbors. We will also focus on establishing greater connectivity in South Asia and our expanded neighborhood to promote the movement of goods, services, investment and technology so that we can act as a motor of growth in this region. The Services are an inalienable arm of our diplomatic outreach and I expect them to play a full and effective role in this national endeavor."⁴⁹ Yet, India is beginning to understand the reality that aspiring to be a great power and acting as if it was one is entirely different from being one.

In the sub sections of this chapter, India's military capability and economic capacity address and show the link between how India plans to attain great power status beyond the region. Consequently, India's relationship with China, the US, and the influence of its nuclear capability are factors that define its global patterns of behavior.

India and China

The relationship between India and China will have the greatest effect on India's foreign policy in the future. Amit Gupta states, "The relationship with China has the ability to either lead the two countries

⁴⁸ Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, ix.

⁴⁹ "Government of India Web Directory," accessed March 13, 2013, <http://goidirectory.gov.in/index.php>.

into an era of great prosperity or, if poorly managed, aggravate tensions and lead to an arms race between the two largest countries in the world.”⁵⁰ While India and China cooperate on trade negotiations, climate change and a few other areas of congruence, they are both competing for wealth, energy, and influence as emerging powers.⁵¹

The pattern of amity-enmity based on the interdependence between the two countries has also caused India to conduct securitization and desecuritization concerning China’s foreign policy and military activities. Harsh V. Pant states, “Despite the rhetoric of cooperation, distrust of China is growing in India at an alarming rate.”⁵² The differences in power distribution make for an interesting security dynamic. On the one hand, India is the dominant regional power of the South Asian RSC, but its relationship with China is that of middle power to great power at best. The struggle for India is acceptance as a powerful state within its own RSC, but the perception is that it lacks acceptance by China as a rising player that should be accommodated into the global political order.⁵³ Geography is another source of tension and conflict on the global level.

In essence, the Sino-Indian border conflict has existed since 1914. India inherited its border layout from the British, but the Nationalist Chinese and Tibetans rejected this arbitrary border area in a 1914 conference.⁵⁴ Many attempts to settle tensions have failed concerning the disputed territory. However, the matter reached another level of complexity in 1950 after China had annexed Tibet and the Dalai Lama fled Tibet as an accepted refugee to India.⁵⁵ The Jammu and Kashmir province is the specific area of dispute. Jammu and Kashmir province is

⁵⁰ Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, 57.

⁵¹ Mukherjee and Malone, *India’s Contemporary Security Challenges*, 97.

⁵² Harsh V. Pant, “India Comes to Terms with a Rising China,” in *Asia Responds to its Rising Powers*, eds. Tellis et al., (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research), 100.

⁵³ Pant, *Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers*, 100.

⁵⁴ Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, 58.

⁵⁵ Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, 58.

an area claimed by both India and China. Aksai Chin is a part of China's Xinjiang province and from India's perspective; it is a part of their Northeast provinces. India and China fought a border war over the disputed territory in October 1962. The Chinese army advanced into India and gained control over a large portion of the contested Tibetan plateau, leaving New Delhi what is now the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.⁵⁶ India's humiliating loss in this war still influences how New Delhi views and interacts with Beijing.

Recently, China made additional claims on Arunachal Pradesh and there have been frequent incursions into the India state of Sikkim causing the old tensions to resurface. India interprets China's sea-based and land-based actions as expansionist and intended as encirclement, a string of pearls strategy. Jeff Smith, a Kraemer Strategy Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council states, "What riles India most is China's incursion into its backyard and the belief China is surrounding the subcontinent with its "string of pearls"—Chinese "investments" in naval bases, commercial ports and listening posts along the southern coast of Asia. There are port facilities in Bangladesh and radar and refueling stations in Burma. Thailand, Cambodia and Pakistan now all host Chinese "projects;" China's crown jewel is the Pakistani deep water port of Gwadar."⁵⁷ Each of these Chinese actions represent a pearl that India views as a link in a chain of the Chinese maritime presence to strangle India's regional and global interests. Another major irritant for India and growing bilateral divergence with China is the relationship the Chinese foster with Pakistan.

India is constantly adjusting its strategic calculus based on the all-weather friendship between China and Pakistan. The relationship only exacerbates the Indian security dilemma between both Pakistan and

⁵⁶ Jeff M. Smith, "The China-India Border Brawl," *Wall Street Journal*, June 24, 2009, sec. Opinion Asia, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124578881101543463.html>.

⁵⁷ Smith, *The China-India Border Brawl*.

China. It makes India's regional and global security moves much more formidable bracketed by a great power, China on one side and a nuclear capable Pakistan on the other. One of the biggest concerns for India is China has provided technology and designs for a workable nuclear weapon and missiles for delivery systems.⁵⁸ This is a balancing move to keep India focused on Pakistan and limit India's ability outside the South Asian region. However, India is responding to China's rise and its balancing actions by mixing internal consolidation and external partnerships with countries like the US, Australia.⁵⁹ India cannot solve its China challenge at the military-strategic level right now. Amit Gupta suggests, "Such a challenge would require a massive investment in its conventional and nuclear capabilities, which the Indian government, with its commitment to national development, would not be able to fulfill."⁶⁰ India's best source of balancing China in the near term has been its partnership with the US.

India and the US

India and the US share a common security interest—containing China. This is a major factor sustaining the basis of their relationship, but India's pragmatic approach elucidates its desire to remain autonomous from the US unlike the Japanese. Residual Cold War suspicions continue to color the political mindsets of both India and the US adding a level of complexity to any bilateral agreement—especially those governmental and military in nature. However, Amit Gupta believes there is promise in a future relationship stating, "The post-Cold War international system has seen the rise of China as a near peer competitor to the US, and in an effort to engage in offshore balancing in Asia, the US has sought to enlist India as a potential ally."⁶¹ Another aspect is how India views itself as a reformist state—one that accepts the

⁵⁸ Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, 61.

⁵⁹ Pant, *Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers*, 127.

⁶⁰ Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, 72.

⁶¹ Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, 75.

structure of the international system but seeks to make small changes to increase its own power potential and status.⁶² Because of the lack of trust, relations between India and the US remain limited in scope. The two countries seek to utilize each other for mutual benefits in line with their national interests. One of the major issues has been whether the two countries can see beyond each other's divergent worldviews and build lasting partnerships that will provide stability in the Asian supercomplex.

From a historical standpoint, the US-Indian relationship suffered from differing world perspectives, but this changed after the Cold War when a fiscally strained India sought assistance from American groups in the form of arms trade. This manifested in the transfers of technologies to assist in the development of India's conventional weapons production programs.⁶³ This is a significant step in preparing India to serve as an effective balancer against the Chinese, the building up of the Indian military. Robert Blackwill, former US ambassador to India, explains the importance of a capable Indian military force:

“Of course we should sell advanced weaponry to India. The million-man Indian army actually fights, unlike the post-modern militaries of many of our European allies. Given the strategic challenges ahead, the US should want the Indian armed forces to be equipped with the best weapons systems, and that often means buying American. To make this happen, the US must become a reliable long-term supplier through co-production and licensed-manufacture arrangements and end its previous inclination to interrupt defense supplies to India in a crisis.”⁶⁴

This clearly marks a change from the non-existent cooperation between the two countries to the trade in high technology, civilian space research,

⁶² Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, 84.

⁶³ Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, 77.

⁶⁴ Robert D. Blackwill, “The India Imperative,” *The National Interest*, no. 80 (Summer 2005): pg. 11.

and nuclear energy cooperation.⁶⁵ The strongest ties and the area with the greatest potential to influence China's containment is US-Indian military to military relations.

Because an offshore balancing strategy gains it comparative advantage from naval and air power, the joint naval and air exercises, are excellent precursors to the actually implementing the strategy within the Indian Ocean Region. One of the biggest detractors to comprehensive interoperability and joint exercises is the caution by the Indian political elite about using military power extra-regionally and aligning itself too closely with the US.⁶⁶ Another facet of Prime Minister Singh's address to the Combined Commander's Conference focused his senior leaders on the issues of jointness, training, doctrines, and strategies, and of integrated decision-making structures and weaponry, all of which require support from indigenous research and production capabilities.⁶⁷ The US can assist India in all these areas and allow them to maintain their autonomy and create the type of security environment in the region that is mutually beneficial. Despite the arms trade and transfer of technology, the likely way forward for India is to purchase systems from Europe and the US, but maintain its long-standing military purchasing ties with Russia.⁶⁸

A Nuclear India

The conceptual idea of India developing a nuclear weapons capability goes all the way back to 1947. In 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test—the Smiling Buddha, the culminating event was India's first nuclear fission test on May 11, 1998.⁶⁹ So why did India seek a nuclear capability outside of attaining national prestige? According to a 1996 US Defense Department report, the main reason was to redress

⁶⁵ Kiesow and Norling, *The Rise of India*, 110.

⁶⁶ Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, 95.

⁶⁷ "Government of India Web Directory."


⁶⁸ Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, 97.

⁶⁹ George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), 4.

threats to its security, namely China and Pakistan, both of whom possess a nuclear capability as well.⁷⁰

Ironically, Pakistan followed India's nuclear declaration by announcing its capability on May 28, 1998. These actions increased the securitization by both countries against each other's nuclear arsenals. One way to view India's nuclear capability from a global order point of view is that of a nuclear third tier state. Amit Gupta defines a nuclear third tier state as follows, "Third tier nuclear states (which currently include India, Israel, Pakistan, and possibly North Korea) have forces that are numerically small, not technologically advanced, limited in range to their regions, and do not have a deterrent capability against first or second tier nuclear states."⁷¹ From this definition, South Asian strategic subsystem defines India's global nuclear order built from the two-class system of nuclear powers created through the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968.⁷²

Figure 5. Global Nuclear Order



Source: Karsten Frey, *India's Nuclear Bomb and National Security* (London: Routledge, 2006), 13.

⁷⁰ Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, 5.

⁷¹ Amit Gupta, *The U.S.-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary Interests?* (Carlisle, PA: SSI, U.S. Army War College, 2005), 18.

⁷² Karsten Frey, *India's Nuclear Bomb and National Security* (London: Routledge, 2006), 13.

The depiction above shows the nuclear balancing behavior that India conducts on China, but also the balancing by Pakistan on India. Prior to 1998, both states nuclear opacity overshadowed their rhetoric, but after declaring themselves as nuclear weapons states, they entered into a minimum deterrence posture.⁷³ The nuclear dynamic between the two states is scary considering their historical narratives concerning regional conflict, not to mention Pakistan is on the verge of being a failed state further exacerbating the nuclear unknown. If a shooting war began between India and Pakistan it could potentially escalate into nuclear confrontation. With a nuclear force focused primarily on Pakistan and western China, India lacks the prestige and influence within the international system it is trying to attain.

Prestige is the currency of great powers. By virtue of possessing nuclear weapons capability, a state gains some level of great power respect regardless of the size of its nuclear arsenal. Although the focus of India's nuclear power is regional, it brings a certain level of national prestige. Having a nuclear capability fits within the context of India's desire to be recognized as a great power. Karsten Frey highlight this idea in, *India's Nuclear Bomb and National Security*, that the attributed symbolism of having a nuclear capability was not seen as devices that would be used as elements of military power, but rather as symbolic elements of political power.⁷⁴ Despite India's long-held notion of not using nuclear weapons for their military applicability, the development of the capability followed a rational global foreign policy model.⁷⁵

Ultimately, the development of nuclear weapons was less about maintaining the status quo for India rather than showing its military power. Nuclear weapons served as a political tool that would potentially make a dynamic change in the international system in India's favor—

⁷³ Karsten Frey, *India's Nuclear Bomb and National Security* (London: Routledge, 2006), 15.

⁷⁴ Frey, *India's Nuclear Bomb and National Security*, 18.

⁷⁵ Frey, *India's Nuclear Bomb and National Security*, 18.

acceptance by the great power as one of them or at a minimum that of an emerging power.⁷⁶ Despite India's rhetoric to the contrary, it remains just a nation with a nuclear capability, but it has failed to develop enough of a nuclear deterrent and range of its nuclear missiles that China or another first tier state should take seriously.⁷⁷ Moreover, India lacks a second strike nuclear capability from submarines, which further diminishes great powers from taking it seriously. India continues to make gradual gains in obtaining the moniker of a global power. Amit Gupta states, "The 2006 US—India nuclear agreement has made India both a de jure and a de facto nuclear power. These kind of great power endorsements are what India's needs if it is to serve as an effective and credible balancer. Outside of nuclear weapons, India's military capabilities represent another component of its defense capabilities. India's geostrategic location suggests that its military is likely to play an important role in India's role as an effective balancer.

India's Military Capability

As an emerging power, India's military capability will continue to be a source of its national power. India currently has the fourth largest military in the world.⁷⁸ India's strategic forces consist of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Paramilitary forces. India's total armed forces number 1,325,000, with 1,155,000 in reserve forces.⁷⁹ India has deployed about 20 per cent of its army on internal security duties, which has affected India's ability to project power externally. Other states in the international system have taken issue with India's inability to influence beyond its borders, because India has made claims it is an emerging power and should be treated as such. Traditionally, India has focused on the primacy of land power because its two biggest threats have been Pakistan and China.

⁷⁶ Frey, *India's Nuclear Bomb and National Security*, 20.

⁷⁷ Gupta, *The U.S.-India Relationship*, 18.

⁷⁸ Kiesow and Norling, *The Rise of India*, 26.

⁷⁹ *The Military Balance 2012*, 243.

India is in the process of modernizing its forces to ensure it has the full spectrum of capabilities to operate as both an effective land and naval power. India is increasingly focusing on naval capabilities to ensure it can protect its interests both internal and external to the South Asian RSC. In 2012, Forecast International published a report saying, “The Indian armed forces are essentially old-fashioned; in conceptual terms, and they have not changed since the 1960s. The problem is that the sheer size of the military, at least 1.2 million men under arms, absorbs most of the resources needed for modernization.”⁸⁰ Simply put, India substitutes numbers for sophistication, but they are looking to incrementally change this dynamic through modernization. Modernization or transformation is increasingly important for India and the region. Ashley Tellis suggests, “The defense transformation strategies followed by different Asian states reflect their specific threat environments, economic performance, security dilemmas, and national regime and state structures. This change has the potential to alter the region’s strategic balance, and poses significant opportunities and challenges for both the US and Asia.”⁸¹ India’s modernization has also allowed for the diversification of its source for arms procurement, its traditional reliance on Russia has given way to increased trade with Israel, France and in particular, the US.⁸² Yet, Russia remains India’s primary military supplier. India is looking to become self-sufficient in arms production, but to date has been unable to achieve any sustainable capabilities to break away from importing many of its arms from outside suppliers. Although procurement and modernization have taken place on a smaller scale than the other armed forces, the Indian Army remains the most important branches of the military.

⁸⁰ “Foreign Military Markets: Asia, Australia & Pacific Rim,” in *India* (Newtown, CT: Forecast International/DMS, 2012), 11.

⁸¹ Ashley J. Tellis. “Military Modernization in Asia,” in *Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty* ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), 2.

⁸² *IHS Jane’s Sentinel*, South Asia, 186.

The history of India's conflicts have taken place primarily on land, making the Indian Army the largest branch of the armed forces, the third largest army in the world and one of the most important components that protects its national security. The Army was defeated in 1962 by the Chinese, but it redeemed itself with successes in two wars with Pakistan of 1965 and 1971. The Indian Army consists of 1,129,900 active duty personnel with a reserve force of 960,000 personnel.⁸³ The primary role and function of the Indian Army is to preserve national interests and safeguard sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of India against any external threats by deterrence or by waging war.⁸⁴ The secondary role of the army focuses on countering and coping with internal unrest and disturbances. In order to deal with a dynamic and changing geostrategic environment modernization is required as mentioned earlier.

Even though India has one of the largest army's in the world, its antiquated equipment needs updating in order to cope with the threats it is likely to face in the current geostrategic environment. According to Forecast International, the Indian Army received a budget allocation of 14.6 billion dollars for current expenditures, 3.5 billion dollars for capital expenditures, totalling 18.1 billion dollars, which represents about 50 per cent of the total defense budget.⁸⁵ While this modernization is good for the Army, it is somewhat disturbing that half its budget goes toward the branch of military fighting a low-tech counterinsurgency conflict. Because India, a continental nation, has to remain focused on Pakistan, improving the Indian army's capabilities in terms of weight of kit, firepower, and communications is critical considering the geography and low intensity style conflict along the border with Pakistan. However, the fact that the army consumes 50 per cent of the budget does not make

⁸³ *The Military Balance 2012*, 243.

⁸⁴ "Indian Army Doctrine" (Headquarter Army Training Command, October 2004), 9, http://indianarmy.nic.in/indianarmydoctrine_1.doc.

⁸⁵ Foreign Military Markets, *India*.

sense considering India's ambitions to be a great power with an extended reach.

Although India has a large conventional force it has struggled to translate conventional superiority into an effective exercise of power in the face of what it perceives as incessant Pakistani sub-conventional provocation.⁸⁶ India's inability to stabilize a much smaller and less capable Pakistan is another embarrassing geopolitical issue. Land power remains one of the factors by which a state's power measured. Although India has been incapable of overcoming parity of ground forces with Pakistan considering its combined arms capabilities, no doubt an issue that frustrates the leadership in New Delhi, they continue to source funds to upgrade the Army for the future operational environment in hopes it will increase their prestige as well.

The Indian Army has invested \$800 million to fund the purchase of new anti-tank guided missiles, light armored vehicles, new rifles and secure tactical and VHF communication equipment.⁸⁷ By modernizing many of the constituent components within the Indian Army, the challenge becomes balancing modernization to deal with a slow and potentially agonizing low intensity style conflict with Pakistan, compared to the conventional style warfare it might face against China. Regardless of whether the conflict is with Pakistan or China, the focus on domestic stability is a driving factor in India's ability to influence outside the region.

Because India lacks the police and paramilitary personnel numbers it needs to deal with the domestic instability created by Pakistan, the government frequently turns to the army to cope with these issues, diminishing the army's ability to prepare for conventional

⁸⁶ John H. Gill. "India and Pakistan: A Shift in Military Calculus?," in "Military Modernization in Asia," in *Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty* ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), 246.

⁸⁷ Foreign Military Markets, *India*.

conflict.⁸⁸ Comparatively, John Gill states, “China, on the other hand, constitutes one of India’s most important relationships and plays a host of contradictory roles: economic competitor, potential military threat, increasingly important trading partner, occasional diplomatic collaborator, and ally and military supplier of rival Pakistan. This shows the conundrum the Indian Army faces not only in modernizing for the correct threat, but also the type of role the Indian Army is capable of fulfilling as a balancer in the region. Undoubtedly, the Indian Army will continue to be sourced many crucial resources, but another crucial military branch that will assist in making India an effective balancer is the Indian Navy.

Despite India’s focus on land-based conflicts, India’s aspirations of great power status require it to develop and sustain a significant and influential naval capability. Unless India develops a strong naval capability in the next two decades, it will likely be unable to protect its economic interests and energy corridors, and assert a primacy in the Indian Ocean. More than just providing maritime security, Bethany Danyluk believes, “The Indian Navy recently proved the country was a capable partner that could successfully undertake complex humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations in the region. In 2006, India evacuated more than 2,000 Indian, Sri Lankan, and Nepalese nationals from Lebanon during the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, again demonstrating its ability to respond quickly and effectively.”⁸⁹ Indeed, this non-combatant evacuation was impressive and demonstrates India’s potential beyond its region, but to believe India is ready to sustain and execute this kind of operations at any time is premature. History also suggests that a country without a strong navy is

⁸⁸ Gill, *India and Pakistan: A Shift in Military Calculus?*, 239.

⁸⁹ Bethany Danyluk. "Perceptions and Expectations of India-U.S. Defense Relationship," in *India's Contemporary Security Challenges*, ed. Michael Kugelman (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), 120.

unlikely to become a great power.”⁹⁰ India is increasing and modernizing its naval arm for the future threats it might face in the South Asian RSC.

The Navy consists of 58,350 active duty personnel, 7,000 personnel are in the Naval Aviation contingent and India has 1,200 Marines.⁹¹ The Indian Navy has several kinds of warships within the fleet, aircraft carriers (one older Russian model that is inoperable and two newer models scheduled to launch in 2012 and 2014), destroyers, frigates, corvettes, amphibious warfare ships (new LPD planned), mine-warfare ships, and submarines.⁹² Clearly, it is investing in the classes of warships that will provide it the ability to power project. The Fleet Headquarters resides in New Delhi and the navy has several commands located in Mumbai, Vishakhapatnam, Kochi and Port Blair.⁹³

Interestingly, in March 1992, India established the largest naval air station in the southeastern Coromandel Coast, potentially one of the biggest in South Asia.⁹⁴ The Indian Navy claims four roles for defending India: military, diplomatic, constabulary, and benign. The most important role of the navy for this research is its military and diplomatic roles, characterized by, the threat or use of force at and from the sea. This includes application of maritime power in both offensive operations against enemy forces territory and trade, and defensive operations to protect its own forces, territory and trade.⁹⁵ The Indian Navy has played an increasingly critical role within the region. Protecting India's sea lines of communication is important because of the trade and access to energy resources. Access to energy is essential to the burgeoning population and the navy provides the required access to oil, along with using power

⁹⁰ Nicklas Norling, *India and Its Neighbors Development Scenarios 2009-2029* (Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2011), 19.

⁹¹ *The Military Balance 2012*, 244.

⁹² Foreign Military Markets, *India*.

⁹³ *The Military Balance 2012*, 244.

⁹⁴ Foreign Military Markets, *India*.

⁹⁵ “Roles of Indian Navy : About Indian Navy : Indian Navy,” accessed March 16, 2013, <http://indiannavy.nic.in/about-indian-navy/roles-indian-navy>.

projection capability to secure such interests, making the Indian Navy a critical aspect of New Delhi's diplomacy.⁹⁶

The Indian Navy is also capable of covering large areas in the region, but the navy also provides the ability to operate and influence outside the South Asian region as well. Amit Gupta posits, "The Indian Navy has been the lead service in promoting Indian security interests throughout the Indian Ocean Region and the service sees its area of responsibility stretching in the West to the Gulf and as far south as South Africa. In the East, the Navy recognizes that its area of operations extends to the Strait of Malacca, but not further South than that."⁹⁷

The lessons of Alfred Thayer Mahan are resonating in New Delhi with the advent of globalization and India's desires for great power status. The 155 warships in the Indian Navy make it one of the largest navies in the world. India has allocated \$40 billion toward modernization with a majority focused on the navy has set the stage for the addition of three nuclear powered submarines and aircraft carriers to the arsenal, clear steps toward achieving great power status.⁹⁸ Specifically, as Arun Prakesh explains, "International trade, the *sine qua non* of globalization, is carried overwhelmingly by sea, as is energy, the lifeblood of industry. Ensuring stability at sea, as well as the safety of shipping lanes in the face of multifarious threats, has assumed prime importance, and brought maritime forces into sharp focus."⁹⁹ Mahan's theory that the wealth of the nation comes from command of the sea has drawn India closer to developing a blue-water navy advocating deeper economic ties to the Indian Ocean Region and an emphasis on maritime security.¹⁰⁰ The development and acquisition of aircraft carriers and

⁹⁶ Gill, *India and Pakistan: A Shift in Military Calculus?*, 241.

⁹⁷ Gupta, *Indian Perceptions*.

⁹⁸ Norling, *India and Its Neighbors Development Scenarios 2009-2029*, 19.

⁹⁹ Arun Prakesh. "The Rationale and Implications of India's Growing Maritime Power," in *India's Contemporary Security Challenges*, ed. Michael Kugelman (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), 79.

¹⁰⁰ "India Emphasizes on Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean Region."

modernization is a part of India's strategic calculus in making the blue-water navy a reality.

One of the most effective ways India can balance against an emerging China in the region is by increasing its naval activities. Providing security for the sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean Region is mutually beneficial for both India and the US as it shifts the burden from the US Navy and it prevents China's unimpeded access to the natural resources in the region. If China continues to build deep-water ports encircling India, the string of pearls strategy described earlier, as it is in the process of doing now, India will increasingly need a blue-water navy and the multiple listening posts it has established in Madagascar and Mauritius to counter China's expansionist moves that span from Africa back to Southeast Asia.¹⁰¹ While power projection and maritime security are important, the India Air Force will bring a decisive factor to any conflict and extend India's global reach.

The Indian Air Force has transitioned from a tactical force to a force with extended reach. The primary function of the Indian Air Force is to defend the nation and its airspace against air threats in coordination with Army and Navy. The secondary purpose is to assist the domestic institutions during natural calamities and internal disturbances.¹⁰² The Indian Air Force consists of 127,200 active duty personnel with an array of aircraft by role for deployment: light bombers, fight/attack aircraft, interceptors, reconnaissance aircraft and various types of trainers, transports, and helicopters.¹⁰³ India possesses the fifth largest air force in the world, but its aging aircraft are in significant need of upgrade or modernization.

¹⁰¹ Siddharth Srivastava. "India's Strategic and Political Environment," in *India's Contemporary Security Challenges*, ed. Michael Kugelman (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), 70.

¹⁰² "Official Website of Indian Air Force," accessed March 16, 2013, <http://indianairforce.nic.in/>.

¹⁰³ *The Military Balance 2012*, 246.

India still relies on Russia for the majority of its aviation-related imports and this remains so concerning the upgrade and modernization of its aging MiG 29 platforms and the development of the Sukhoi T-50 fifth generation fighter project, with the air force planning to take 166 single and 48 two-seat variants of this technologically advanced aircraft.¹⁰⁴ On the contrary, in June 2011, India signed an agreement to purchase 10 Boeing C-17 Globemaster III, although contractual and agreement issues have created obstacles for future purchases. The purchase of these mobility aircraft is one-step to increasing its relationship with the US, but more importantly, it provides a power projection capability that it can use to compliment the other aviation platforms and balance against China throughout the region. The Indian Air Force is focused not only on Pakistan; it has its eyes on China as well, as it recently acquired 40 SU-30MKIs—one of the most advanced multi-role fighters in the world—also a Russian aircraft.¹⁰⁵ India's Air Force is the branch of the armed forces most in need of upgrade and modernization. Until, it can bring its force into modernity it will remain focused on defense of the homeland in conjunction with the other branches and will assist in limited United Nations operations to continue broadening its engagements outside the region.

The Indian Air Force is looking to further its modernization and acquisition with air-to-air tankers, early warning and control systems, sophisticated air-to-air missiles, and precision-guided munitions, setting the stage for a comprehensive doctrinal review and close integration with the army; yet the Indian Air Force appears to remain focused on its traditional mission sets.¹⁰⁶ However, issues still abound on the homeland defense as Gill suggests that differences between the army and air force over the merits of close air support reduces effectiveness, joint

¹⁰⁴ *The Military Balance 2012*, 217.

¹⁰⁵ Gill, *India and Pakistan: A Shift in Military Calculus?*, 248.

¹⁰⁶ Gill, *India and Pakistan: A Shift in Military Calculus?*, 249.

operations, and have seldom been accomplished smoothly, interestingly, air force-navy cooperation has also been problematic.¹⁰⁷ Clearly, India is gradually improving the capability of its armed forces, but its domestic issues and the integration of national security policy with a focused military strategy may be significant hurdles to overcome. India's military capability is just one of the tools New Delhi has at its disposal of power—it also has a growing economic capacity that it hopes will assist in its transition to one of the great powers in the international arena.

India's Economic Capacity

Indeed, India is an emerging economic power. In recent years, India has seen astounding levels of economic growth, with an average of 8.8 per cent between 2002 and 2008.¹⁰⁸ India did withstand the global economic crisis with a growth of 8.5 per cent in 2010-2011, but India anticipates slower growth as uncertainties influence the market.¹⁰⁹ As Niklas Norling points out, "With a GDP per capita income barely above \$1000, India ranks among the 50 poorest countries in the world."¹¹⁰ Economically, India will need to continue policies that encourage market reforms and allow it to continue to develop as an innovative and globally competitive economic system.¹¹¹ The 2011 economic downturn will be of more significance if India is unable to achieve its previous growth rates.

Norling states, "Maintaining high growth rates is the essential precondition determining whether India can assert a notable presence beyond its borders and preserve social stability."¹¹² Despite these economic issues, India is one of the major economies of the G-20 and a member of the emerging national economies Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS), it currently holds the chair for latter organization, this means there is promise if India is able to continue the needed

¹⁰⁷ Gill, *India and Pakistan: A Shift in Military Calculus?*, 245.

¹⁰⁸ *IHS Jane's Sentinel*, South Asia, 187.

¹⁰⁹ *IHS Jane's Sentinel*, South Asia, 187.

¹¹⁰ Norling, *India and Its Neighbors Development Scenarios 2009-2029*, 7.

¹¹¹ Gupta, *Global Security Watch--India*, vii.

¹¹² Norling, *India and Its Neighbors Development Scenarios 2009-2029*, 13.

market reforms. India was able to change the dynamics of its economy through liberalizing its approach.

India transitioned from its former autarkic style economy to a more open-market driven economy, allowing its national economy to rise in its economic global standing. Former Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, implemented progressive economic changes in the 1990s by liberalizing investment conditions, the capital market, and the exchange rate.¹¹³ One of the problems with major economic changes in a densely populated society like India's is the impact of the changes on labor force. While the changes implemented by Rao were innovative and needed to progress India's economic status, there were some negative second and third order effects. The labor force suffered from skewed salary growth rates in terms of the public and private sectors. Kiesow and Norling contend, "Employees in the public sector, representing a large share of the labor force, got relatively low salary increases in comparison to many of those who were employed in the private sector. The discrepancies created jealousy and strains on the labor market."¹¹⁴

Unfortunately, these changes not only affected the public and private sector, the poorest segments of the society and the growing middle class were the people most impacted by the changes. India's poverty rates have a direct impact on the economy in terms of national productivity and decreasing the gap between the poor and middle class. Currently, India ranks relatively low in terms of the amount of money it spends on health care, resulting in poor health outcomes and only exacerbates the poverty levels.¹¹⁵ The economic disparity between social classes, combined with the second and third order effects associated with this social gap, further complicates Indian domestic politics. The socio-

¹¹³ Kiesow and Norling, *The Rise of India*, 48.

¹¹⁴ Kiesow and Norling, *The Rise of India*, 48.

¹¹⁵ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD Economic Surveys: India*. (Paris: OECD, 2011), 8.

economic divide and inherent corruption in the Indian governing system suggest the way forward for India will be challenging.

As stated earlier, corruption within India's economic apparatus is well known and the accepted norm. The Indian government is trying to address the issue, but they are as much a part of the problem as the local and regional level officials. According to the 2012 Corruption Index, the poor are usually the victims of corruption and because India has such a large poor population, this incessant problem translates to human suffering, with the poor families extorted for bribes to see doctors or to get access to clean drinking water. It leads to failure in the delivery of basic services like education or healthcare, to include how much it derails the building of essential infrastructure.¹¹⁶

The 2012 Corruption Index produced by Transparency International, a global coalition against corruption, ranks India as 94 of 174 countries.¹¹⁷ Additionally, a report from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development states, "Public sector governance should be made more transparent and accountable by separating operational and regulatory functions in the provision of public services and by strengthening the anti-corruption agency through an independent appointment mechanism for its head."¹¹⁸ Corruption is so significant to India's ambitions toward great power status that a failure by the government to get it under control will likely prevent it from reaching this status, let alone being able to conduct basic governance as well. Another aspect of India's economic capacity is the utilization of economic diplomacy to create domestic stability and extend its reach abroad.

Economic diplomacy is an innovative way for India to solve some of its domestic problems and continue along the path of more influence in

¹¹⁶ "2012 Corruption Perceptions Index -- Results," accessed March 17, 2013, <http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/>.

¹¹⁷ "2012 Corruption Perceptions Index -- Results."

¹¹⁸ OECD, *Economic Surveys: India*, 8.

the international system. Kishan Rana and Bipul Chatterjee define economic diplomacy as, “As a multi-hued activity, easy to describe in broad brushstrokes, but harder to pin down with precision. From the perspective of members of diplomatic and commercial or trade services, and those that are the customers or users of these services, economic diplomacy is a plural set of practices, all aimed at advancing the home country’s external economic interests.”¹¹⁹ Economic diplomacy is an additional foreign policy tool New Delhi can leverage to benefit the country. The Indian Ministry of Economic Affairs is trying to translate its economic activities into strategic global influence.

Mukherjee and Malone provide examples of India’s economic diplomacy at work, stating, “Thus India is currently engaged in promoting economic development in Africa, securing oilfields in Central Asia, promoting trade and nuclear cooperation with the US, receiving remittances from its 3.5 million workers in the Gulf and acting as (at times) Israel’s biggest arms market.”¹²⁰ The India Development Initiative drastically reducing the amount of aid it receives represents another unconventional method of economic diplomacy. In addition, India has written off the debts of some poor countries and has decided to increase its aid to other developing countries.¹²¹ India will continue to maximize the benefits that come from its utilization of economic diplomacy.

Until India can develop a unifying strategy and vision for its military power, economic statecraft may present the quickest means for it to lead beyond its region, escape the label as the lead nation of the Third World fighting against imperialism, and progress towards attaining great power status.¹²² India is looking to leverage its economic interests abroad, whether it is in the form of exporting wheat, which is in surplus

¹¹⁹ Kishan S. Rana and Bipul Chatterjee, *Economic Diplomacy: India’s Experience* (Jaipur: CUTS International, 2011), 3.

¹²⁰ Mukherjee and Malone, *India’s Contemporary Security Challenges*, 97.

¹²¹ “India’s Economic Diplomacy,” accessed March 17, 2013, http://www.ibef.org/artdisplay.aspx?cat_id=84&art_id=1335.

¹²² Mukherjee and Malone, *India’s Contemporary Security Challenges*, 103.

or pursuing energy security in regions of Africa, Latin America and Canada.¹²³ Both of these unique economic approaches bode well for India's future success and interaction on the world stage.

India is making great strides in the economic realm with a more open-market economy and gradual implementation of monetary reforms to improve its great power aspirations. However, India has many barriers to overcome in order to be an effective balancer in the region considering its foreign policy outlook, dysfunction within its military, and its domestic issues (sheer size of its growing population, the large poverty rates and persistent corruption) that negatively affect its economic capacity.

¹²³ "India Tries Economic Diplomacy?," *The Asian Age*, accessed March 17, 2013, <http://becomewww.asianage.com/india/india-tries-economic-diplomacy-572>.

Chapter 5

Conclusion: The Balancer on the Pivot as a Way Forward

Although cloaked in the reassuring boilerplate about American military preeminence and global leadership, in reality the Obama administration's new Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) is the first step in the United States' adjustment to the end of the Pax Americana—the sixty-year period of dominance that began in 1945. As the Pentagon document says—without spelling out the long-term grand-strategic implications—the United States is facing “an inflection point”. In plain English, a profound power shift in international politics is taking place, which compels a rethinking of the US world role.

Christopher Layne

Background

The aim of this research was to answer two simple questions. What is offshore balancing and what should the US expect of a balancer in the Far East region? Regardless of whether the US is in a graceful decline or the rest of the world is rising; the US must make hard choices concerning its role in the international system. One way to determine its role is the selection of a grand strategy that achieves its national interests and balances the realities of the current security environment. The adoption of an offshore balancing strategy may be the hard choice required to overcome current fiscal constraints, a stagnant Congress, and the international perception of the US after more than 10 years in combat abroad. President Obama's strategic guidance is a basic framework that could be the catalyst towards adopting such a grand strategy. For the strategy to be an effective, the American public must accept that changes to its fiscal spending and reduction of interventions abroad are required. Otherwise, fiscal issues and interventions could be America's greatest existential threats.

If the US continues down the path of adopting this strategy, what does offshore balancing offer, given the current geostrategic environment? An offshore balancing strategy is a strategy of shifting burdens, not one of burden sharing. The baseline of the strategy is getting other states to do more for their own security rather than relying on the US security umbrella. This translates to the US conducting an orderly phased withdrawal from the Asia-Pacific region.

Because the Asian security environment may change over time, maintaining basing rights with key allies is crucial for reintroducing ground forces alongside allies and partners if they are incapable of balancing on their own. The US is likely to avoid messy situations and conflicts by relying on strategic partners to engage in regional balancing activities, prior to America committing assistance if its national interests are at risk. Another potential benefit of this strategy is the ability of the US to maximize its relative power by standing on the sidelines while other great powers exhaust themselves in security competitions with one another.

Recognizing the benefits of the strategy, the state that America chooses as an effective balancer in the region is the lynchpin to the success of this offshore balancing strategy. Japan and India were the two states selected as potential balancers; their effectiveness to fulfill this role encompassed the detailed aim of this research. Within each case study, the examination of three independent variables set up the framework of the research: patterns of behavior (foreign policy), military capability, and economic capacity. In order to understand the context of the implications provided below, a short review of the three case studies is necessary.

Analytical Review of Case Studies

Pax Britannica

In Chapter 2, the historical example of Pax Britannica served as the foundation of the research and illustrated the validity of an offshore

balancing strategy. The Peace of Britain revealed how Britain maintained its relative position within the international system after it defeated France in the Napoleonic Wars. Great Britain focused on the dynamics of its region through a strategy known as “Splendid Isolation” an offshore balancing equivalent that effectively reduced risk against the other Great Powers established during the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The strategy facilitated the maintenance of the status quo in Britain’s favor for almost 100 years.

Throughout the Pax Britannica era, Britain was able to gather and sustain its enormous wealth, power, and security by attaining command of the sea. During the Crimean War, Britain sent its navy abroad to balance against an expansionist Russia—a clear existential threat to its national interests. Britain maintained a small domestic ground force and used the Indian Army as a surrogate force to protect its interests abroad when they were at risk. Britain’s naval strength also allowed it to manage and secure its informal empire that spread around the globe. Finally, Britain’s economic capacity was the backbone of its dominance. Britain used its economic power to increase its military strength, coerce weaker states, and spread its liberal free market economy, resulting in its ability to dominate one quarter of the globe during this period.

Japan

Chapter 3 examined the factors surrounding Japan’s role as a potential balancer in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan’s geostrategic location in comparison to China was a determining factor in its selection as a potential balancer in the region. Furthermore, its historical legacy as a former great power in the region might reveal its ability to act as a normalized balancer. Japan is reemerging and reshaping the sources of its national power by incrementally assessing the viability of its pacifistic ideology within its foreign policy outlook, modernizing and employing its self-defense force capability abroad, and using economic diplomacy to normalize as a state. Granted, this will take time to come to fruition

based on the research, but given the proper time horizon and credible threats, it appears that it is a reasonable proposition.

Simply put, Japan's incremental changes in all three of the independent variables are required for it to become a "normal nation" that would regain the right to use force in its foreign policy. Relying less on the US security umbrella will help with diminishing the perception and reality of its free rider status under the US. Japan's regional security dynamics are complex. It faces a rising China that has shown considerable influence in the region and tensions that could lead to conflict over the territorial rights of the Senkaku Islands. North Korea's unpredictable security antics serve as threat to Japan and the tension between the two could destabilize the region. The Japanese Self Defense Force remains just that—a self-defense force, but modernization and relooking at the geostrategic environment Japan faces may provide the drivers towards changing into an actual military force.

Japan's economic prestige is a key factor in its transition to a normal country. Checkbook diplomacy has underpinned the Japanese foreign policy and economy in the international arena. Recently, Japan has faced several economic challenges since the collapse of the bubble economy. The declining and aging population of Japan does not help its economic progress. If Japan is going to be an effective balancer in the Asia-Pacific region, the Japanese economy must continue to grow in order for it to fund Japanese foreign policy initiatives, its military modernization, and exploit its previous global economic activities.

India

India is a complex country that is the most powerful state in the South Asian RSC. It is one of the fastest growing economies in the world and has a large conventional military and nuclear capability. India was chosen as a case study because of its geostrategic location, its large conventional military, its emerging economy and its nuclear deterrent capability. Despite India's panoply of foreign policy tools, it has many

domestic issues that prevent it from maximizing them to the full effects, thereby diminishing its great power ambitions. Yet, India has retained a pragmatic and autarkic approach in its foreign policy.

India's long and historical conflict with Pakistan has shaped its geostrategic situation. The focus India places towards Pakistan limits the country from influencing beyond its borders in the way it desires. Other types of internal issues are India's burgeoning population, poverty rates, health issues, water and environmental issues, and its government corruption. Because of the enmity between India and Pakistan, along with the nuclear capability of both countries, there remains a potential for them to destabilize the region and draw other states into the conflict—of particular interest are the US and China.

The Indian Ocean Region is of significant strategic concern because it is vital line of communication for India's trade relations, but the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) also possesses vast natural resources, two-thirds of the world's proven reserves of crude oil, and a third of the natural gas. China is India's greatest challenge external to the South Asian RSC. The interdependence between the two countries has influenced the patterns of amity-enmity causing India to conduct securitization and desecuritization concerning China's foreign policy and military activities. India's military is a source of its national power. It is currently undergoing modernization of all of its forces to ensure it has a full spectrum operations capability.

However, the dysfunction within the armed forces to cooperate and jointly operate has been a drawback. The Indian Navy is quickly increasing its relevancy with a focus on the Indian Ocean Region and India's desire to operate and influence beyond the South Asian RSC. Finally, India is an emerging economic power that wants to use this material capability to increase the benefits for the country. It has transitioned into an open-market driven economy, abandoning its former autarkic style economy which has increased its global standing.

However, India must overcome many barriers (sheer size of its growing population, the large poverty rates and corruption) to realize its ambitions of great power in the region. These issues may be too much for India to overcome if the US seeks to rely on them as an effective balancer.

Implications

A comprehensive review of the three case studies reveals that Japan and India both have the mechanisms and structure to serve as balancers in the Asia Pacific region. Neither of them is ready at present to serve as independent balancers without considerable assistance from the US. There are some significant hurdles to overcome for both countries to serve as balancers. Yet, China is not going to wait for either Japan or India to get their foreign policies, military capabilities, and economic capacities in order to balance against it. Nor should the US wait to leverage what each offers an offshore balancing strategy. Therefore, an analysis of Japan and India with regard to their current foreign policy outlooks and material capabilities allows us to conclude the best way to implement an offshore balancing strategy in Asia is by choosing Japan as the balancer and not India.

Japan has significant potential as a balancer against China. It not only has a legacy of great power status, it does not have as many domestic issues that prevent it from making the transition into a “normal” country. Japanese policymakers are only one generation away from the era when Japan ruled as a great power in the Asian Pacific region. While the rise of China is a threat to the US, regional security complex theory has shown that China is a much bigger threat to the countries in the region. Japan must convince its populace that China’s rise is indeed an existential threat to their national security interests. The articulation of this credible threat will eventually change Japan’s ideology—this appears to be only a matter of time based on the dynamics of the current security environment. The majority of the issues that it

faces are ideological in nature; for example, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution says Japan will no longer build war potential and the country foreswore the use of violence or the threat of violence to solve international conflicts. Understanding that changing a long established national ideology is difficult, the flashpoints in the current geostrategic environment serves as the best catalyst for Japan to revise its foreign policy views and then use its military capabilities more aggressively to protect its national interests.

The time has come for Japan to act like a “normal” country and shed the free rider status it enjoys from the US. An offshore balancing strategy is not a strategy of isolationism. Therefore, the US is not going to let Japan go at it alone. It does imply that Japan must provide more of its own national security. This is the logical outcome for a “normalized” Japan. The termination or revision of the Mutual Security Treaty should reflect this foreign policy change. In addition, the US can continue to assist Japan with its transition by providing or assisting with the acquisition of whatever kind of military capabilities, it needs to operate as a normal military force vice a self-defense force. A particular emphasis on its naval and air capabilities will be required to mitigate China’s anti-access strategy for the region.

Another critical aspect of Japan’s ability to operate as an independent and normalized great power is the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons. This is a critical requirement for Japan to properly influence in the region, but mainly will serve to balance against a nuclearized North Korea and China. A Japanese nuclear deterrent arsenal and increased power projection capabilities are fundamental components for this strategy to work. Undoubtedly, an aggressively armed Japan with a modernized and upgraded military component may alarm many other countries in the region considering Japan’s historical narrative. However, a stable region is in Japan’s best interests—the likelihood of loose cannon behavior is minimal based on

its neighbor's capabilities and Japan's reflection on what its historical narrative has meant for the region.

Finally, Japan's economic capacity has been the hallmark of its foreign policy since World War II. If Japan is ever to normalize as a country, its economic capacity underpins its ability to do so. John Mearsheimer explains that wealth underpins power and wealth alone can be a good indicator of latent power. Based on Japan's current economic capacity, if it desires to be a normal country it has the necessary capital to do so. One of the remaining questions is does Japan have the will to change, considering the growing threats it faces from neighboring countries. It will be interesting to observe their actions as they consider the risks and threats against their national security interests. This research reveals that Japan can regain its former status and turn its wealth into military power—a major currency of any great power. Providing a way forward has been the aim of this research. The following policy recommendation offers policymakers, scholars, and the lay reader a possible approach for effectively leveraging an offshore balancing strategy in the contemporary security environment.

Policy Recommendation

In light of the analysis concerning Japan's patterns of behavior, military capabilities and economic capacities, a policy recommendation is necessary. The US should leverage Japan's unique capabilities as the preferred balancer in the Asia region. This recommendation attempts to account for the precarious security environment Japan is currently facing and the environment it may potentially face in the future. As Layne points out, a careful implementation of offshore balancing strategy is the best option for the US. Undoubtedly, if the US adopts the strategy it will seek to buck pass to Japan with a full understanding of what it will get as its return on investment. Specifically, the US will only look to get involved only if specific national interests are at risk.

Based on analysis of the research, Japan has the least amount of issues to overcome as a multi-purpose balancer in the region. Japan must revise its pacifistic constitution to allow it to normalize as a country. The logical outcome of this strategy will be the withdrawal of the majority of US forces from the RSC. The US must realize the foundation of the RSC and its current stability relies on the US security umbrella being in place. It will take time for the region to adjust to its overt absence, but balance of power theory suggests that Japan and other states in the region will adjust over time because they will have no choice in the anarchic security environment.

By adopting a long time horizon for the strategy, it provides the needed time for Japan to continue with modernization, transitioning from a self-defense force into a military force—another logical outcome of this strategy. Japan's current military structure, modernization activities, mutual security treaty (US alliance) and legacy of former great power status combine to give Japan a strategic advantage over India serving as a balancer from multiple perspectives. The Japanese MSDF and ASDF are currently capable and increasing their capability to cope with China's anti-access strategy. Given the time to adjust to the new strategy and the translation of North Korea and China's actions into existential threats, Japan would be capable of regaining its former status as a "normalized" great power in the region. By normalizing, Japan would now be able to power project throughout the region, a capability Japan requires from a credibility standpoint.

The acquisition or development of nuclear weapons is the next logical step in making Japan a credible threat and balancer against China. The US will have to relax its NPT standards and assist Japan with appropriate technology transfers. It is impossible to see China taking Japan seriously without it possessing and operating a nuclear deterrent capability outside the US security umbrella. While this may seem unnerving to its Asian neighbors, the capability currently exists in

the form of the US security umbrella—the Japanese just do not own or operate it because of their constitutional constraints. This would represent a major modification in Japan's current foreign policy outlook.

Indeed, there are barriers to overcome for Japan to be a normalized balancer in the region, but it has the framework and legacy to overcome this problem. Until then, the US can benefit from using Japan's current capabilities to share in the burden of active balancing in the region, allowing it to draw down its force structure. The question surrounding Japan will always be: does it have the will to make the changes, modifications and revisions if the security environment presents Tokyo and its populace with clear existential threats?

Indeed, Japan is declining in terms of its relative power, but its potential is promising to balance and influence China if it makes the recommended changes. If the US is willing to work within a long Japanese time-horizon and provide assistance in the critical areas of military capabilities and nuclear weapons acquisition—Japan can fulfill the role of effective balancer in the region.

India's role as a balancer at the present should be limited. Analysis suggests India has too many domestic problems that span its foreign policy domain, its military capabilities and economic capacities that prevent it from serving as an effective balancer right now. Despite its rhetoric as an emerging power, it has not been able to translate its potential into power that is truly respected on the world stage. More research will be required to examine the changes, modifications or revisions of both Japan and India's patterns of behavior, military capability and economic capacities if they are to serve as balancers in the Asian region.

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